The Cleft: The Similarity of Fundamental Doctrines of Law which Underlies their Conceptual Formulation in Different Legal Systems by Newman, Ralph A.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 2
1-1967
The Cleft: The Similarity of Fundamental
Doctrines of Law which Underlies their
Conceptual Formulation in Different Legal
Systems
Ralph A. Newman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Ralph A. Newman, The Cleft: The Similarity of Fundamental Doctrines of Law which Underlies their Conceptual Formulation in Different
Legal Systems, 18 Hastings L.J. 481 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol18/iss3/2
The Cleft: The Similarity of Fundamental
Doctrines of Law which Underlies
their Conceptual Formulation
in Different Legal Systems
By RALPH A. NEwMAN*
The chapter of History that must soonest be rewritten is the chapter
of the Assimilation and Harmonization of World-Law.**
CARDOZO, in his famous lectures on The Nature of the Judicial
Process, refers to the presence in Anglo-American law of "certain large
and fundamental concepts, which comparative jurisprudence shows
to be common to other highly developed systems."1 Many of the
fundamental concepts, of which Cardozo and others-Vico, 2 an Italian,
Ehrlich,3 a German, Wiirzel,4 an Austrian, and Ripert,5 a Frenchman-
have spoken, arise out of "standards of right conduct, which find
expression in the mores of the community," 6 and which, as Del Vecchio
has superbly said 7 measure the degree of the humanity of laws.
Another type of fundamental concept is based only indirectly on
standards of individual morality and is anned primarily at establish-
mg the conditions of an effective social order.8 The evolution of law
o Professor of Law, Umversity of Califorma, Hastings College of the Law.
* Wigmore, Editorial Preface to the PROGRESS OF CONTIENmAL LAW In TBE NiN-
TEENTE CENrtmY.
I CA ozo, Tm NArouR oF T E JUDIcIAL PRocEss 65 (22d ed. 1964).
2 Vrco, PMICpl :DI UNA, SCENZ. NUEVA D'iTIMNO AM COMMUNE NATURA DELLA.
NAZIOi (2d ed. 1725). For an excellent discussion of Vieo's philosophy see Cochery,
Les Grandes lignes de la philosophle histonque et ]undique de Vico (Thse Pans 1923).
8 Emmiciz, PrNcImLEs OF THE SOCIOLOGY oF LAw (1962). "Those elements that
are universally human, and that must exist mn every society." Id. at 298.
4 WibnzEL, DAS jumsrTiscH Dma-mN § 26 (1904).
5 
RrPERT, 2 RwE DES COuVS DE L'ACAzEmIE Du DR OIT In-ENATIONAL No. 6,
at 575 (1933).
6 CAnnozo, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72. ALLEN, LAw 3N THE MAMNG (6th ed. 1958)
says that "the popular sense of justice has a real meaning m law, since it
represents an average element in the community with which it is necessary that law
should harmonize; and most of the equitable or discretionary ingredients which are
constantly found in legal systems are based on this primary sense of justice inherent in
the average moral sense of the community." Id. at 405.
7 Del Vecchio, Les bases du droit compare et les princzpes gn6raux du droit, 12
R3VEUE INTMrNATIONALE DE Dnorr ConAE 493 (1960).
8 Stammler, Lmm VoN DEm BiCHrimcE RECars 208 (1919).
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consists of the progressive harmonization of individual and social
values, starting with security, advancing to individual justice and
reaching finally the stage of social cooperation to attain the individual
goals of existence. Legal values cannot be arbitrarily divided into
those which satisfy either individual, or social, interests. These interests
frequently conflict, but there are also many circumstances in which
they comcide. Societies consist of individuals. The satisfaction of
individual interests requires organs of social control to reconcile con-
flicts in the interest of the whole social group, but there is also a
strong social interest in the individual life. It seems that the doctrines
which are based primarily on the demand for individual justice rather
than on the need for social order exhibit a closer resemblance to each
other in different legal systems; but whatever their objectives, the
basic institutions of law in many different systems exhibit an essential
similarity There seems to be no reason why these elements could
not constitute a common core of understanding for uniting legal
systems in what has been called a common law of mankindO and
provide an effective means of commuication, among nations, of ideals
of individual justice and social progress. If a system of private world
law is, as many legal philosophers feel, in the process of being formed,
an essential step in the process must be to reconcile the fundamental
concepts of existing legal systems.10
It has been said that law "is not a mere enumeration of formal
rules, but is the translation of the most profound aspirations of
people."11 It should not surprise one to find that law in different parts
of the world produces similar institutions, since the need for law arises
out of deeply seated emotions of human nature; emotions which are
not essentially different in people of different parts of the world. Nor
should it surprise one to find that the particular manifestations of
these fundamental emotions differ in the course of their multifarious
applications in different times, circumstances and cultures. It has long
since ceased to be fashionable to ignore the methods which have been
employed in other parts of the world for the solution of conflicting
human interests. One of the world's greatest comparatists has said
9 JENKS, TH Co oN LA W OF MANuw 172 (1958). In popular Latin, sus gen-
tium meant the common law or usage of mankind. Lex naturalis was the translation of
-pomvov taLOV of the Greeks-natural law.
10 "Avant de parler d'unification, il est necessaire de coordiner entre eux les syst~mes
existants." (Before we talk of unification, we must coordinate the existing systems) LEVy-
ULLmA , Vars LE Dnorr MoNixL iu XXE SiEcLE. Sarfatti, Le droit compar6 en fonetion
de l'unification du droit, 3 RuvuE IEwRNATIoNALE DE Dnorr ComrA u 69, 71 (1951).
11 RENi CAssiN INTEN-TATioNAL LAw ns CONVENoN I ISRAEL 337 (1958).
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that "our foremost task is to bridge the age-old cleft that runs through
the western laws, separating the Anglo-American 'common law' from
the 'civil law' "12 Most studies in comparative law are addressed to
the differences between legal systems. Such studies, which are, of
course, essential, reveal that the differences are largely in rules of appli-
cation of underlying principles which are not essentially dissimilar
from one legal system to another. The cleft, on close exammation,
apparently results from superficial flaws rather than from basic faults.
We can help to bridge the cleft by remembering Hegels aphorism
that one can relate a thing to something else by perceiving the sin-
larities as well as the differences. It is the purpose of the present study
to examine some basic doctrines of private law which, although they
are expressed in formulae which differ from nation to nation, will be
seen, when they are analyzed from the viewpoint of their actual effect
on the solution of legal controversies, to approach one another more
and more closely in the course of the evolution of law and as the true
objectives of law become more clearly identified. It is felt that such
an analysis will reveal the essential similarity of the underlying doc-
trines which are expressed, in different legal systems, in very different
conceptual forms.
The Nature of Ownership
Ownership of the Thing Versus Ownership of Interests
There is a basic conflict between the conceptual approach in
common law and in civil law to the nature of ownership of property
The civil law regards ownership as ownership of the physical property.
Obviously, there cannot be exclusive ownership of a physical piece of
property by different persons at the same time. The Roman law doc-
trine of domiznum, according to which divided ownership of property
is impossible, has been preserved in the civil law doctrine of absolute
and indivisible ownership. There can be in civil law no divided owner-
ship,"3 although the ownership may be subject to restrictions which
permit exclusive enjoyment of the property by one person for a period
of time and which will entitle another person to the exclusive enjoy-
ment of the property in the future. In the common law no one need
1 Rabel, Private Laws of Western Civilization, 10 LA. L. REv. 1 (1949).
1 3 CoD Crm FRANcAis art. 544 (57th ed. Dalloz 1958) [hereinafter cited as FaEN CH
Crvm CoDE]; BiftGEP.UcHEs GEsEIZuCH § 903 (Ger. 22d ed. Palandt 1963) [hereinafter
cited as GERm"AN Cwm ConE]; CODE Crvm SUIssE art. 642 (1937) [heremafter cited as
Swiss Cmr. CoDE]; R.S.F.S.R. Cwmi CoDE art. 58 (U.S.S.R. 1931) [hereinafter cited as
SovMr CrVM CODE].
own all the property 14 Ownership is looked upon as ownership of
different interests in the physical property on the plane of time. Differ-
ent persons may own different interests in a piece of property at the
same time, even though the enjoyment of the property may be post-
poned until different periods. The person who is entitled to the present
enjoyment of the property for a period may be the owner of an interest
in the property for that period, and at the same time another person,
who will be entitled to the enjoyment of the property thereafter, may
be the owner of an interest which he will enjoy in the future. In the
common law, contemporaneous ownership of interests, which entitle
different persons to enjoy the property during different periods of time,
is possible. Otherwise stated, ownership can exist even if the right of
enjoyment is postponed. One would expect to find that, in civil law,
ownership could exist only if accompanied by the present right of
enjoyment. It is at tius point that a fallacy of the civil law concept of
indivisible ownership is revealed, since ownership can exist in civil
law, just as in common law, without a contemporaneous right of
enjoyment of the property
The common law doctrine of estates in land originated out of the
needs which arose in a system of feudal tenure. Under this system,
which has long since become obsolete, the Crown owned all the land,
and only interests in the land could be privately owned by feudal
tenants. This system of landholding was carried into the lower echelons
.of feudal tenure. In modem law the division of property ownership
into present and future interests is the conceptual basis of successive
rights to the enjoyment of the property The same motive, provision
for successive rights of enjoyment of property, underlies many institu-
tions of the civil law, and these institutions display close resemblance
to the common law doctrine of estates. The distinction is in conceptual
approach rather than in substantive rights and obligations. In civil
law, in the case of successive rights of ownership, there is no power
in the person entitled to the current enjoyment to alienate the property
gratuitously If the property is sold the proceeds are subject to the
same rights of succession to the enjoyment which existed before the
sale; but this may be so in common law as well. In common law, a
power of sale does not necessarily transform a present right of posses-
sion and enjoyment into ownership in fee;15 nor does the requirement
14 "French law knew of land that was owned; but from the time of the Conqueror
English law only knows of land that is held." Holdsworth, Introduction to BiussAuD, A
HIsTony OF FRENcH PRIVATE LAW at xxv (1912).
15 2 SnEs & SMITE, FuTurE INTrESTS § 893 (2d ed. 1956). The remainder wich
follows such an interest is valid. Lord v. Atchison, 12 Cal. 2d 691, 87 P.2d 346 (1939);
3 S ms & SmE.E op. cit. supra at § 1488.
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that the proceeds be substituted for the property sold preclude the
existence of present ownership, as is demonstrated in the common law
trust by recognition of a trustee's ownership of trust property as to
which a power of sale exists.
The strong paternalism of European governments is reflected in
the extent to which law intervenes in social and economc life. An
example is the restrictions placed on the power to create successive
rights of enjoyment of property Such rights may be created, in civil
law, only in favor of specified classes of persons and in specified
situations. It should be recalled that only by reason of unexpected
consequences of the English Statute of Uses", was a comparable
rigidity removed from the common law institution of estates in land.
The effect of the executory interests which could be created under
the Statute was to validate limitations which could not take effect as
contingent remainders according to the rules of common law 17 There
are many situations in civil law in which property interests are valid,
which closely approach the common law concept of ownership divided
according to the time when the enjoyment is to begin and according
to the duration of the enjoyment.
Successive Ownership in Civil Law
In civil law, succession of interests in property is provided for by
two institutional techmques. In one of these techniques the entire
ownership is in the first taker, subject to a right of other persons to
become the owners on his death. In the other technique, ownership
is charged with the use of the property by other persons for their lives
or for a shorter period, similar to the ancient use of common law and
resembling in many respects the modern common law trust.
In French law, property may pass by inter vivos gift, on the death
of the donor, to a party to a marriage or to the children to be born
of the marriage if the donor survives the immediate donees.18 This
transfer is very similar to the creation in common law of a shifting
estate or a contingent remainder following a retained life estate. A
similar kind of transfer may be made, inter vivos or by will, on the
condition that if the donor dies leaving no children, the property shall
belong to his brothers or sisters and, on their death, to all their
children.19
In German law also it is possible to create successive ownership
1627 Hen. 8 c. 10 (1536).
174 KENT, CoN ,ErrxEs 268 (14th ed. 1896).
iS Fnaac Cn. CODE art. 1082.
19 FENcH CriL CODE art. 1049.
of property The doctrine of Vorerbschaft, or forced heirship, treats
the first heir, the Vorerbe, as the owner of not merely an interest for
his life but as the owner of the entire property until the stipulated
event occurs and the property devolves upon the Nacherben, the
secondary heirs. Section 2100 of the German Civil Code provides that
"the testator may appoint an heir so that he does not become heir
until another has first been heir." Section 2103 provides that "if the
testator has directed that the heir at a certain point of time, or upon
the occurrence of a certain event shall surrender the inheritance to
another, it is to be assumed that the other is appointed as reversionary
heir." These are shifting estates which at common law would be
executory interests or contingent remainders. Section 2105 provides
that "if the testator has directed that the appointed heir shall receive
the inheritance only at a certain point of tine, or upon the occurrence
of a certain event, without directing who shall be the heir until then,
the legal heirs of the testator are the immediate heirs." This interest
corresponds to a springing estate at common law Section 2109 pro-
vides that "the appointment of a reversionary heir becomes of no
effect upon expiration of thirty years after the succession, unless the
event of the subsequent succession has occurred before." In the situa-
tions to which the rule applies, it constitutes a Rule Against Per-
petuities. There are provisions m the Austrian Civil Code ° which
restrict the number of successive transfers of property, and in Swiss
law2 l only one reversionary heir may be appointed. In these kinds of
successions the first heir cannot destroy the subsequent interest by
a sale, since the proceeds are substituted in law for the property sold;
and he cannot dispose of the property gratuitously unless pursuant,
in some cases, to a moral duty This system of transmitting property
is confined to the transfer (by instruments of testamentary nature
although not necessarily wills) of the estate as a whole, to successive
owners. 2 The system does not apply to the transfer of separate parcels.
In a New York case, which involved the ownership of New York land
by a German citizen, it was held that the restriction on donative trans-
fers made the interest of the first heir a life estate, under rights and
obligations similar to those of holders of life estates at common law.
Therefore the court concluded that the estate was not liable for estate
20 OEsTEFREICHscHE GESE-TZ arts. 611-12 (Austria 25th ed. Kapber 1955) [hereto-
after cited Ausnuw CIvn CoDvI.
21 SWISS CvirL CODE art. 488(2).
2 2 See 1{hemstem, Some Fundamental Differences tn Real Property Ideas of the
"Civil Law" and the Common Law Systems, 3 U. Cm. L. tBEv. 624, 626-27 (1936).
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tax on the death of the life tenant. The power to sell the property
and to substitute the proceeds did not, according to common law
principles, enlarge the estate into a fee simple. The court held that a
life estate with power to invade the corpus followed by remainders
to the sons had been created.
The system of forced heirship, existing in all civil law countries,
establishes rights which, except for the restriction against gratuitous
transfers and the restriction that the proceeds of a sale are substituted
in law for the property sold, are almost indistinguishable from a
theoretically perpetual series of life estates. The civil law institution
of forced heirship may also be analogized to the common law estate
tail as it formerly existed in England and which is still recognized to
a limited extent in a few states2 4 The first taker of 6n estate tail was
the owner of the entire estate, but he could not cut off the rights of
expectant heirs. Similarly, in the civil law institution of forced heir-
ship, the first heir owns the entire property The expectant heirs own
no rights in the property, but in case of a sale, their rights to become
the owners in the future prevent termination of their interests by the
legal technique (however ineffective in practical result) of substituting
the proceeds in place of the property sold. In civil law jurisdictions the
creation of such estates is not left to the voluntary act of the current
owner of the property, as it is in common law, but is mposed by law;
the system not only permits but requires a potentially perpetual succes-
sion of life estates. In common law the entailment of the property is
far less prolonged, since the duration of divided ownership is subject
to severe restrictions by the Rule Against Perpetuities in the case of
contingent interests and by the rule against protracted suspension of
the power of alienation in the case of both vested and contingent
interests.
Ownership Subject to Rights of Others in Civil Law
Although in civil law a portion of the estate, called in French law
the reserve legitime and in German law the Pflichtteilsrecht, descends
to the heirs, the rest of the estate is freely disposable. From the
Frankish period one encounters estates consisting in the enjoyment of
land for life.25 The property interest which is known in civil law as
23 In re Hirschinann's Estate, 124 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
2 4 Delaware: Hazzard v. Hazzard, 29 Del. 91, 97 AtI. 233 (1916). Maine: McCarthy
v. Walsh, 123 Me. 157, 122 AtI. 406 (1923). Massachusetts: Gilke v. Marsh, 186 Mass.
336, 71 N.E. 703 (1904). Rhode Island: Sackett v. Paine, 46 R.I. 439, 128 Ad. 209
(1925).
2s5 BmSSAuD, A HISTORY OF Fa-NcH P1V.ATE LAW § 329 (1912).
the usufruct, and winch exists in French, German, Swiss, Italian,
Austrian and Spanish law, closely resembles the Anglo-American life
estate. The right of usufruct is the right to use the property and to
receive the fruits; the usus and the fructus.26 "The usufruct is the right
to enjoy things belonging to another person, as the proprietor himself,
but subject to the charge of conserving the substance." 7 The "thing"
is "grev6 d'usufruit,"28 charged with the use. Plamol criticizes the fore-
going definition of the usufruct in the French Civil Code on the ground
that it neglects to state that the usufructuary's enjoyment is essentially
a life estate and that it operates as a real right.29 The institution of
usufruct is derived from Roman law,30 where, because Roman law
looked at property as indivisible, it was one of the personal servitudes.
The view of property as indivisible was appropriate to a simpler
societal culture, and it is probably responsible for the sharp distinction
drawn in civil law between the right to the use of property and the
right to the corpus of the property In civil law the institution of
usufruct has been elevated to the status of a property right.31 The
usufruct in French law is contrasted with the nu-proprzet, the naked
ownership of the property The usufructuary has the usus and the
ftructus, but the right of alienation is in the nu-proprzitazre.3 2
26 M z-~D, MAzEA D & MAzEAVD, LEcoNs DE Dnorr cawm No. 163 (3d ed. 1963).
27 FR- cH Cn. CODE art. 578.
2 8 Judgment of July 10, 1963, [1963] Recueil Dalloz 644 (Cass. civ. Ire).
2 9 PLAMIOL & RiPERT, TnhArn PiATiQtE Du rmorr civiL muNCAis pt. 2, No. 2747
(12th ed. 1939). Holdsworth, in his Introduction to BinSSArD, op. cit. supra note 14, at
xxxix says that "if our common law had been developed by lawyers like Bracton who bad
a knowledge of medieval French law, the course of its history would have taken on the
history of the law of the 'pays du droit couturmer,' and our reversions and remainders
would have been substitutions in trust; our estates for life would have been usufructs."
Maitland explains the obligation of feudal tenants, until the year 1200, to obtain the
lord's consent to alien the fee on the theory that the tenant was considered nevertheless
to be .the owner, but whose power to alienate was restrained. See Thorne, English
Feudalism and Estates m Land, CANw. L.J. 193 (1959). This could well be the explana-
tion of the forced heirship of civil law.
30 A codicil granted land to a grandson on the terms that he was not to alienate it
away from his land and family. Those who had issue were to leave it to them, with cross
gifts to survivors, of the shares of those who died without issue. An heir of the testator
claimed the property on the ground that the wife and mother were not of the family. It
was held that they were members of the family, so that there bad been no breach; but
Justiman decreed that the present holders might do what they liked with the property,
and that for the future no such prohibition was to be allowed for more than four genera-
tions. This became the "common" law fideicommissary substitutions in the countries
governed by Roman law. BucNr , A TxErnoou oF RomANc~ LA W 363-64 (3d ed. 1963).
See Strickland v. Strickland, [1908] A.C. 551.
a See GEi.-mAx CrviL CODE § 1065.
3 2 MZTEAD, MAzFAuD & MAZErATD, op. cit. supra note 26, No. 163.
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There are in French law three types of usufruct which arise by
operation of law and which Plamol calls "legal" usufructs: (1) the
right of parents in thngs of their children until the children attam
the age of eighteen; (2) the right of a surviving parent upon the suc-
cession of children; and (3) the right of a surviving spouse.33 In addi-
tion, rights of usufruct may be created by private act. A charge, called
the penswn viagere, may be created in favor of a surviving spouse,
3 4
and the property may be conveyed to the direct heir, reserving the
usufruct to the former owner 5 The right of the usufructuary is limited
to a use which will not destroy the substance of the property,36 under
penalty of the loss of the right of usufruct. Only the rights of the
usufructuary can be transferred by him, and not the ownership of the
physical property itself, even for the life of the usufructuary s This
restriction would seem to be of little practical importance in most
cases, since it would be only rarely that a person would buy property
which he could never enjoy unless he outlived the usufructuary. The
right of the usufructuary includes the right to possession,3" upon giving
such security as may be required by the court. This security is not
required where it is eliminated in the instrument by which the usufruct
was created40 or, in a few special situations, where the usufructs are
created by law In all civil law systems, freely disposable property
may be transferred (either inter vivos or by will) to a person for his
life, the donor or his estate retaining an interest which is very similar
to the common law reversion.
Limitations on Rights of Ownership
Servitudes
The doctrine of indivisible ownership of land is subject, even in
civil law, to important exceptions in the case of rights to use the
property of another. The institution of servitudes has been inherited
from Roman law. As in common law, servitudes are deemed to be
interests in the land over which the right to use them exists. Servitudes
are recognized in French, German, Italian and Soviet law Discussions
of servitudes in French law avoid the terms "servient" and "dominant"
3 1 FLANIoL & RrPERT, op. cit. supra note 29, No. 2761.
34 FAi~cH Cvn CODE art. 205.
s5 FENCH CwVI CODE art. 918.
36 FaENCn CwI CODE art. 578; GmauAN Cw. CODE § 1041.
ST Judgment of July 10, 1963, [1963) Recueil Dalloz 644 (Cass. civ. Ire).
3 8 MA2zAuD, MAZEAuD & MAZE-AD, op. cit. supra note 26, No. 163.
39 Fr.Nca CnxrM CODE arts. 600-01; GEamA Crvm CODE § 1036.
40 Fpn.R Cwvm CODE art. 601.
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estates for fear of reviving memories of feudalism;4 but there is never-
theless a charge on one estate for the benefit of another estate. Since
the charge may be perpetual,42 it is no different from a property inter-
est; and in fact servitudes are described in the French Civil Code as
"heritages."43 In German44 and Soviet 45 law, the remedies for the
enforcement of servitudes are different from the remedies which are
available for the protection of rights of ownership; but if the servitude
permits possession of the land, the holder may also assert the possessory
remedies which are available m both those countries.46 The civil law
servitude thus seems to constitute another example of divided rights
of ownership which are thoroughly recogmzed in civil law
Trusts
The same principle of indivisible ownership, which in the view of
most civilian jurists precludes the reception in civil law of the common
law concept of estates in property, is thought by civilians to present
an equally insuperable obstacle to the reception in civil law juris-
dictions of the common law trust. The reason for this reluctance to
accept the trust is that the trust is based on rights of different persons
in the trust estate. The trustee has legal title to the property and the
beneficiary has, depending on the view of the particular common law
jurisdiction, either an equitable interest in the property or a right to
compel the trustee to carry out his duties in respect to the purposes
for which the property is to be used. The view of the beneficiary's
interest as an interest in the property is not essential to the validity of
the trust, as is evidenced by the acceptance of the trust m New York
and California, in which states the right of the beneficiary is not a
property right at all but is merely a personal right against the trustee.
It is still true, however, whether the interest of the beneficiary is
regarded as real or personal, that the interests of the trustee and of
the beneficiary may conflict. There are many situations in which civil
law institutions exist which are not essentially unlike the common law
trust, and the common law trust has been accepted in many civil
law countries without creating any alarming distortion of the con-
ceptual structure of the legal systems of those countries.
4 1 Judgment of July 27, 1874, [18751 Recueil P6nodique et Critique I. 375 (Cass.
civ.); see FBrEcH Civm CoDE art. 637; accord, Gm.A- CIVrM CODE § 1019, CocinE
CIvrLE art. 531 (Italy 1948) [hereinafter cited as ITrA.iAN CiVIm CoDE.
42 1 PLANIOL & RPERT, op. cit. supra note 29, No. 2888.
43 See BE_ AmNrO, CorwuMms DE BEAvAISIS ch. 23 (1889-1890).
4 4 GEnmAN CIVIL CoDE §§ 1004, 1027.
45 Sovir Cxvm CoDE art. 1132.
4 6 GE mAN CirL CoDE § 1029; SoviEr CrIV CoDE art. 996.
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Roman law recognized the trust concept m the doctrine of fidet-
commissum, which m later Roman law became a device for enforcing
the rights of a beneficiary to whom the testator wished to leave the
property but who was ineligible to receive it directly from the testator.
The property could be left to an intermediate taker to hold for the
ultimate beneficiary The immediate taker was entitled to enjoy the
property for his lifetime. Another device, the usufructus, compensated
for the defective rights of a surviving spouse. Also, from the time of
Hadrian, there could be provision by will for the maintenance of a
child until puberty Finally, there was the institution of hereditas
jacens, a junstic person who represented the undetermined heirs until
they accepted their inheritance. From the fidetcommsssum developed
the civil law institution of the fideicomumssary substitution, or the
entailing of property for a limited term.
In the law of France there are many analogies to the common law
trust. A guardian may be appointed to administer the property which
has been given to the beneficiary, even if the beneficiary is of full
age, and this period of adminmstration may continue for the lifetime
of the donee. Property may be given to children subject to a charge
for their children m turn, and the income may be accumulated during
the minority of a beneficiary, with a special administrator to accumu-
late the revenue.48 There are similar provisions in the Swedish Law
as to Intestate Succession.49 In all civil law countries there is provision
for public foundations which are no different in any essential respect
from the charitable trust of Anglo-American law Examples are to be
found in the Spamsh Civil Code, 0 m the Austrian Civil Codesi and
in the German institution of Stiftung, a foundation with juristic person-
ality The foundation, a legal person, owns the property, without the
intervention of any trustee; but in the United States, direct gifts to
charitable corporations for specified purposes are treated in the same
manner and with the same consequences as trusts for charity The
family foundation of Swiss law5 goes further than the common law
private trust because it may last forever, although the provision is
strictly construed." The rights of the beneficiary are purely in per-
4 7 FBRENC CIVIL CODE art. 1055.
48 Fnta CIVIL CODE art. 1073.
4 9 SWEDISH LAW AS ro INTESTATE SuccESsioN c. 8 (1928).
50 CoDIGo CVm ESPANOL art. 35 (Spare 1955) [heremafter cited as SPmNIsH CrvIr
CODE].
51 AusTmm Crvm CODE art. 646.
52 SwIs CIVIL CODE art. 335.
53 73 Entscheadungen des Reichsgenchts Im Zivilsachen 11. 87 (1947).
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sonam and cannot protect the property itself against improper transfer,
as is also the case in the German concept of Treuhand. In the civil
law countries, as in the United States, there may be trusts for masses.
That the common law trust presents no conceptual difficulties in civil
law jurisdictions is amply demonstrated by the acceptance of trusts
in Scotland, South Africa, Ceylon, Chile, Venezuela, Panama, Mexmco, 4
Quebec, Japan, 55 Louisiana, and, in the case of business trusts, Lichten-
stem. In Venezuela, although the legal system of that country is based
on Italian law in which trusts are anathema, there may be trusts for
living persons, as is also the case in Mexico if the trustee is a bank
with credit powers. Regardless of the conclusion which may be reached
in any particular civil law country as to the practical desirability or
lack of desirability of the common law trust, it seems clear that no
conceptual obstacles bar its reception in civil law.
It is clear that there are many exceptions to the civil law concept
of indivisible ownership. The conception of the nature of the interest
of successive owners, as an absolute ownership rather than a life estate,
and the conception of the right of usufruct as a right to the income, or
"fruits," of the property without any ownership of either a life estate
or an absolute interest in the corpus of the property, approximate the
Anglo-American concept that property can be held in ownership
divided into present and future interests. Conceptually, the Anglo-
American institution of estates in property may be looked upon as fall-
mg midway between the two civil law institutions: the succession of
absolute ownership and charges on absolute ownership for the present
or future use of other persons. There would seem to be little practical
difference whether there are two owners of different estates in the
same property, as in the common law, or one owner of property
charged, as in the civil law, with the right of another person to become
the owner of the property in the future. The civil law doctrines of
indivisible ownership and the common law doctrine of estates, often
cited as the basic distinction which differentiates property ownership
in Anglo-American countries from ownership in civil law, thus produce
substantially similar results. The relatively umportant differences in
the practical results should not obscure the essential similarities of
doctrine.
54 The trustee must be a corporation with credit powers. See BAAn, TRUSTS 3x
MExico, IN CiviL LAw AID nN Tm MoDmN Won.LD 128-31 (1965).
55 The reception began in 1905. For the development since then see the Japanese
statutes referred to in Kashikawa, Book Review, 8 HosE NAGoYA 30 (1965).
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Transfers of Personal Property by Possessors
without Title or Authority to Transfer
The problem of the rights of a person who acquires personal
property from another person who was m possession of the property
without either title or authority to transfer, is dealt with in civil law
and common law from exactly opposite approaches. A basic doctrine
of the law of property m civil law is that possession of tangible, mov-
able property is equivalent to title when rights of third persons are
concerned. This doctrine, which is an outgrowth of the civil law con-
cept of indivisible ownership, is expressed unequivocally in the civil
codes of France,56 Switzerland 1 and Germany "I The basic approach
of the common law is precisely the opposite. There, a bona fide pur-
chaser for value, from one who was in possession but without authority
from the owner to sell, acquires no greater rights than inhered m the
person who was in possession when the property was acquired,5 9 in
the absence of some special circumstances or estoppel against the true
owner.
60
In Roman law there was no doctrine resembling the doctrine that
possession is equivalent to title; no right based on possession apart
from ownership was recognized, and thus the owner received complete
protection and could reclaim his goods, whenever they had come
into the possession of another person without the owner's consent.e1
Only by long-continued possession, the doctrine of usucapto, could
rights be acquired by another person and the right of ownership be
separated from the right to possession. Goods which had been stolen
or lost could not be acquired even by prescription; and only when the
acqurer was ignorant of the rights of the true owner did the statute
transfer to him the right of ownership.62 The doctrine was abandoned
m France in the sixteenth century and was replaced by the doctrine
that possession is equivalent to title when the rights of third persons
are concerned. Curiously, the Roman doctrine which protected the
rights of the owner re-appeared in the common law Despite the
5 6 FENCH Ownm CODE art. 2279; DE FoLLEvE, Tn nr DE LA POSSESSION DES
mLS im DE Trnms Au PotTEuR No. 8 (2d ed. 1875).
57 Swiss Cnm CODE art. 919.
58 GmAx CiVL CODE § 932.
59 See Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 H~nv. L. REv. 1 (1887).
60 O'Conner v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318, 32 Ad. 1029 (1895).
61 
GAius, INsTruruoNum Julus Crwms comment 2, § 45 (4th ed. Poste transl. 1904);
DE FoI.tEvm.LB, op. cit. supra note 56, No. 11.
6 2 DE FoI I v=, op. cit. supra note 56, at No. 11.
adoption of the doctrine that possession is equivalent to title, Article
1116 of the French Civil Code provides that an acquirer with knowl-
edge of the rights of a third person must surrender the property to
the true owner. Title does not pass, n civil law, to an acquirer in bad
faith. This qualification of the basic doctrine goes far toward bringing
the two approaches into closer resemblance than the basic conceptual
approaches would seem to indicate.
The problem of what effect should be given to unauthorized trans-
fers of personal property is usually approached m civil law from the
viewpoint of comparing the benefits of security of property rights,
which is considered to require a preference for the rights of the
owner, and the benefits of facilitating the participation of prop-
erty in trade, which is deemed to require encouragement of the
salability of the property The two considerations are only superficially
antithetical, since the objective of participation in commerce is itself
facilitated by the assurance of the right of an acquirer to retain his
ownership against unauthorized transfers. In Anglo-American law,
no clogging effect on commerce by the emphasis on security has been
felt. Whatever the reason, in common law, almost controlling emphasis
is placed on security of property; but in civil law, it is placed on
salability
In comparing the position of acquirers of personal property who
have obtained the possession from a person without title or authority
to make the transfer, four principal factors must be taken into account:
1. The circumstances under which the owner parted with possession-
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, as for example through loss or
theft;
2. The effect to be given to the acquirer's knowledge that his imme-
diate transferror was without authority from the owner of the property
to transfer it;
3. Whether the acquirer gave value for the property or received it
gratuitously; and
4. The nature of the interest, whether title or possession, which passed
to the acquirer.
1. The civil law countries draw, in general, a broad distinction
between situations in which the property was originally transferred
voluntarily by the true owner and situations in which the property
was originally lost by the true owner or was stolen from him. The rule
generally followed is that if the property was lost or stolen, the owner
can reclaim it from a subsequent acquirer. This rule prevails in
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France,O Belgium,64 Germany,63 Switzerland,66 Spain 6 7 and Portugal68
In Italy69 and Austria,7" the acquirer prevails regardless of the manner
in which the owner parted with or was deprived of the possession of
the property If the property, even though lost or stolen, was acquired
at a fair, in a public market or from a merchant who dealt in similar
articles, the owner's right to reclaim the article is subject to the con-
dition that he must reinburse the acquirer for the price he paid for it.
This qualification of the right of the owner to reclaim the property
exists in France,71 Belgum,7 2 Switzerland,3 Span, 74 Portugal75 and
also in Mexico.
76
2. Good faith-that is, absence of knowledge or reason to know
of a limitation on the authority of the person in possession to transfer
the property-is required to enable the acquirer to keep the property
in France,77 Belgum, 7 Germany,19 Switzerland,80 Italy,81 Austria,82
Span 83 and Portugal. 4 But in Spare85 and Portugal 6 even a good faith
acquirer must surrender the property to the owner.
6 3 FAEcH Cnvm CODE art. 2279.
64 Belgium has adopted the edition of the French Civil Code published Sept. 3,
1897 except as abrogated by specific Belgian legislation.
6 5 GERm Crnx CODE § 935; HANDEsGE SET -uCH § 366 (Ger. 1902) [hereinafter
cited as Gzua.~ Comlimcmi. CODE].
66 Swiss C vL CODE art. 934.
67 SsANisH Crwm CODE art. 464; EL CODIGO DE Comcixnco art. 85 (Sparn 1911)
[hereinafter cited as SPANISH ComnizaciAL CODE].
6 8 CODiGO Civm PORTUGuES art. 533 (Portugal 1948) [hereinafter cited as Poctu-
CUESE CxvIL CODE].
69 ITALIAN Civm CODE art. 1153.
7 0 Aus amx Cvim CODE art. 367; AsTRANI CoimEIcmAL CODE art. 366.
71 FxmNca Cxm CODE art. 2280.
72 Note 64 supra.
73 Swiss Crv-n CODE art. 934.
74 SPANISH CxVIi CODE art. 464, 1955; SPANISH ComvmacrAL CODE art. 85.
75 PORTuOES Civii CODE art. 534.
76 CODO Cxvii MEjico art. 799 (1950) [hereinafter cited as MExcAN CrMxL CODE].
77 On the analogy of Article 1141. which refers to consecutive transfers; the earlier
transferee prevails, if in good faith.
78 Note 9 supra.
79 GEiMA_- CiviL CODE § 932; GEDmAN Comlnvmcsc.a CODE § 366. In German law
good faith is established if the acquirer reasonably believed that a merchant had the right
to transfer the property.
80 Swiss Cvim CODE arts. 714, 933, 936.
8 1 ITALIAN Cx-ii CODE art. 1147.
8 2 AsTmAN Civii, CODE art. 367; AusTrax Comm:EncuL CODE art. 366.
8 3 SPANISH CxvM CODE art. 464; SPANIsH Com24xaciAi. CODE art. 85.
8 4 PORTUCUEE CIVIL CODE art. 520.
8 5 Decree of June 19, 1945, RBvuP GENERAi jUiuspDEN=C cwvnx 376 (1945);
3. Except in Portugal87 and Austria, 8 the fact that the acquirer
received the property gratuitously does not defeat his right to retain
it, without reference to whether the possession was transferred to the
intermediate possessor by the original owner either voluntarily or
involuntarily
4. In Portugal the acquirer, in order to retain the property, must
have acted in good faith89 and must have acquired the legal title. 0
In German, 91 Spanish 2 and Portuguese 3 law, title does not pass
after the period of the statute of limitations has expired, unless the
acquisition was in good faith. However, in German law an action for
unjust enrichment will lie against a gratuitous acquirer.9 4 Continental
law treats gross negligence as equivalent to bad faith. 5 In French
law, in the case of an unauthorized acquisition of land, good faith is
not required in order for the acquirer to obtain title after the statute
has run for a period of thirty years, but is required at the commence-
ment of the shorter prescriptive period of ten or twenty years, de-
pending on the proximity of the owner's habitation to the situs of the
land.9" In the case of a purchase or gift of personal property from a
person who was not the owner, good or bad faith is to be determined
at the time of delivery In English law the element of negligence is
excluded when good faith is in issue.97
In summary, in most European countries the acquirer in good faith,
even without having given value, can retain the property unless it
had been lost or stolen. If the property has been lost or stolen, the
owner can reclaim it, but when such property has been acquired in
good faith at public sale or from a merchant, the owner must reimburse
the acquirer. In Anglo-American law, good faith, value and title are
Sauveplanne, La protection de 'acquireur de bone fot d'oblets -mobiliers corporel, 1961
UNmnorr YEAwoox 43, 55 n.1.
86 PoaRouEsE CiviL CODE art. 518.
87 Ibl.
88 Note 70 supra.
8 9 
PORTuGuESE Cnvr'L CODE art. 532.
90 1bd.
91 GEMA.N Crivi CODE § 937.
92 S aNMsH Cvrm CODE art. 1955; SPAiNSK Comzv=ncLr. CODE art. 85.
9 3 
PORTUGUESE CwVmi CODE art. 527.
9 4 GERMAN Civm CODE § 816(1).
9 5 GurrEmm=E, ConPArIvE LAw 97 (1946).
98 FRENCH CiviL CODE art. 2265.
9 7 GurE=GE, op. cit. supra note 95, at 97.
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required to protect the acquirer except in special situations such as
cases, covered by the Factors Acts,9 in which an agent is entrusted
with goods but without authority to sell unless certain stipulated con-
ditions are observed, usually a mmnmum price; cases of money99 or
other media of exchange such as negotiable instruments; 10 cases in
which a seller has retained title after delivery of goods sold;'01 cases
of title fraudulently obtained;102 and cases of estoppel.' 3 In England,
an additional exception is the case of sales in public market, unless the
property was stolen.10 Public markets include ordinary stores. It is
worth noting that in a careful review of the whole problem by Pro-
fessor Sauveplanne, the Secretary-General of the International Insti-
tute for the Unification of Private Law, it is recommended to the
Institute that the rights of acquirers "a titre gratuit" (without giving
value) should, if allowed at all, be subject to some limitations. 105
Whether or not the suggestion is adopted by the Institute, the eliim-
nation, in almost all civil law systems, of the requirement of giving
value, if the acquirer in good faith is to be preferred over the original
owner, can have little practical effect, since persons who dispose of
property which is not their own or over which the power of disposition
is lacking, and who therefore fall under liability to the owner, do not
ordinarily dispose of the property unless to their own material advan-
tage; such circumstances are not calculated to stimulate the instinct
of generosity. Some of the civil law rules are of ancient origin. The
Code of Hammurabi provides in section 9 that a purchaser of a stolen
article from a thief must return the property to the true owner and
may recover the money paid from what is significantly referred to as
the estate of the seller. Section 279 of the same code provides that in
a sale at market overt, the former owner must compensate the pur-
98 The Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c.71, §§ 21-25. (Section 21 of tis
act has been excluded by Hire-Purchase Act 1964, c.64.) On the effect of the Factors Acts
see Prentice v. Page, 164 Mass. 276, 281 N.E. 279-80 (1895).
99 1 Salk. 126 (msi pnus, before L. Ch., J. Holt); Brown v. Perera, 182 App. Div.
922 (1918), affirming without opinion, 176 N.Y. Supp. 215 (App. Div.) (opinion of
referee in court below also pnnted).
1 0 Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758); Grant v. Vaughan, 3
Burr. 1516, 97 Eng. Rep. 957 (K.B. 1764); Uixwonm NEcOTAIABLE INsTRurmmNs LAw
§ 57; UNwoBm.t Comi crAL CoDE § 3-305.
101 UNwoBm CONDrrixoNAL SALas Acr § 5.
102 Butters v. Naughwout, 42 Ill. 18 (1866).
103 See case cited note 60 supra.
104 Statutes cited note 98 supra. As to stolen goods see Walker v. Matthews, 8 Q.B.D.
109 (1881).
105 Unification of Law, 1961 UinRorr YEAnnook:.
chaser as a condition to recovering the property The Code of Manu,
sections 201 and 202, contains similar provisions.
In the case of successive sales of personal property by the same
owner to different persons, the first purchaser prevails at common
law 06 In Swiss law, the first to acquire possession prevails.10 7 Even
though delivery is essential to the passing of title to personal property
in German, 08 Swiss'0 9 and Spanish"0 law, and although in French"'
and Italian'12 law title passes upon the making of an agreement to
that effect, the transfer, as a foreign comparatist has pointed out,i3
cannot be compelled until the price has been paid.1 4 Thus, the same
practical result is reached in French and Italian law as in the law of
Germany, Switzerland and Spain. The result is also the same at com-
mon law, even in cases in which title has passed, since in case of failure
to pay the purchase price, delivery cannot be compelled by the
purchaser.
In successive assignments of incorporeal property, French law
protects the assignee who first gives notice to the debtor, on the anal-
ogy of Article 2279 of the Civil Code. The common law countries are
divided. In England the same result is reached as in French law 11"5 In
the United States, ordinarily the first assignee in time prevails." 6 In the
case of transfers of real property, ownership in some civil law juns-
dictions depends on registration-" In other civil law jurisdictions, as
an the United States and in some counties of England, registration
merely operates as a bar to rights acquired by third persons, and it is
not necessary to the effectiveness of the previous transfer."
8
106 See BRowN, PERsoNAL PRoPERTY 226-32 (2d ed. 1936).
10 7 SWIsS Crvx CODE art. 922.
30 8 GmAN CiviL CODE § 929; GmiMAN Commmcrc. CODE § 366.
109 Swiss Crvm CODE art. 922.
110 SP ISH CIVxI CODE arts. 1095, 1462.
111 FiNcH Civir, CODE arts. 1138, 1583. A sale is complete when the parties have
agreed on the subject matter and the price. Judgment of Nov. 26, 1962, [1963] Recueil
Dalloz 644 (Cass. civ. Ire); see FnFi NCv Civi. CODE art. 1583.
1 12 ITALIAN Civm CODE art. 1376.
11 Puig Brutau, Realism zn Comparative Law, 3 Am. J. CoiMP. L. 42, 52 (1954).
114 FIENcH Civr. CODE art. 1612; ITALxrN Civir. CODE art. 1498; SPANIsH Civii.
CODE art. 1466.
115 Deare v. Hall, 3 Russell 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1830).
116 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs, § 173 (1932); Salem Trust Co. v. Finance Co., 264
U.S. 182 (1824).
117 E.g., AusrmAN Crvu. CODE art. 431; CEmAN Civi. CODE § 873; GERMAN Com-
mERcIAL CODE §§ 656, 731.
"Is D6cret du April 1, 1955, art. 30 (Fr.).
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Rights and Obligations Arising out of Voluntarily
Assumed Relations
The Enforceability of Promises
In early Roman law no action would lie on a naked promise. The
law required a request, and a promise made m response to the request,
in order to emphasize in the mind of the promisor the finality of his
engagement and to justify reliance upon the promise by the person to
whom it was made. In Roman law, causa meant actionability and not
something independent of actionability which produces that charac-
teristic.1 9 This explains a reference in the Digest which seems to re-
quire causa apart from the agreement, in the case of menominate con-
tracts in the form of the stipulatio. The doctrine of causa as a separate
element was, it is generally believed, introduced by the glossators.1
20
The civil law proceeds on the basis of either of two theories: on
the theory of causa or on the theory of a promise deliberately made,
even without either consideration or causa. Gifts, called "donations,"
are often subject, however, to certain formalities, such as authentica-
tion by a notary, which is -required in French221 and German 22 law.
Even in the common law it has been stated by no less an authority
than Williston that "it may fairly be argued that the fundamental basis
of simple contracts historically was action in justifiable reliance on a
promise."1in The requirement of consideration was introduced, on the
analogy of a trespass, to overcome procedural difficulties .1
2
Fifoot is of the opinion that the doctrine of causa was used in canon
law to overcome the rule of classic Roman law that no action would
lie on a naked promise; that is, that a promise to be enforceable must
have been made with a serious purpose.125 Benevolence or the dis-
charge of a moral duty would suffice.128
In French law, contractual obligations are enforced even though
119 BucxLAD, A TEnrnoox oF Rom" LAw 426 (1921).
120 The word "causa" in DIGEST law 7, "De Pactis," is interpreted in the Gloss of
Accursius to mean cause which makes a promise valid; Gloss of Accursius to DIGEST
42.1.3.1; SOHm, INsTrruTms or ROMAN LAW 371 (3d ed. Ledlie transl. 1907); see
Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MicH. L. BEV. 495, 498
(1958).
12 1 FRENCH Cwm CODE art. 931.
1 2 2 GMAA Civm CODE § 518.
123 1 WmLL-STON, CowrRAcrs § 139 (rev. ed. 1937).
124 See Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HA)v. L. Rav. 1, 53 (1888).
125 FiFooT, HISTORY AND S01MCF-S OF THE COiMiMON LAw 306 (1949).
126Decretal, Greg. IX, II.22..4; see EsmEiN, ETrEs Sun LES CONTRATS 65.
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they are gratuitous, provided that cause (French) is present.' Ac-
cording to the French comparatist David, cause is the reason for in-
curring the obligation.128 The cause of a promise is the purpose for
which the promise was made, rather than the immediate benefitu 9
It includes a desire to confer a gratuitous benefit.130 In the view of
Capitant, cause is the end which one proposes to attam by the con-
tract. 3' The French Civil Code enforces promises to perform moral
obligations in specific situations: the obligation of parents to establish
a son or to endow a daughter; the obligation of an heir to fulfill unen-
forceable testamentary obligations of his ancestor; the obligation to
compensate for an unenforceable injury; or the obligation to pay a
debt discharged in bankruptcy or voidable for infancy 132 In such cases
the promise is enforced even in the absence of formalities of execution.
In English law one is bound not because he has made a promise
but because he has made a bargain. 33 Corbin has said that the function
of courts is "the determination of whether or not there is good reason
for enforcing the promise sued on-a question of social policy" 34 The
doctrine of causa does not exist in Germany,'35 Austria
3 Portugal3'3
or Belgium.:3 In Louisiana both causa and consideration are re-
quired.8 9 In a decision of the Cape Supreme Court of the Union of
South Africa, causa and consideration were held to be identical; neither
is required. 40 Since this rule was established in 1919, it is said that no
127 Capitant, De la cause des Obligations, in 2 Couns EiiENmE DE DRorr CmarI
AqccAs No. 1014 (1923).
128 Cause is "le motif pour lequel une personne s'engage" (the motive for wbich one
binds himself). DAvm, MELANGES JACQUES MAuRY 134 (1960). See GonrA, IL Cox-
mrATro (1955).
129 6 P. NIOL & PU'mT, TnArr PRATiQ E Du DRorr civu. IEAN A s No. 952
(1954).
13o judgement of Aug. 16, 1881, [1882] Recueil P6nodique et Critique I. 478 (Cass.
req.).
131 Capitant, supra note 127, No. 1014.
132 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, op. cit. supra note 129, No. 978.
133 CnEsinm & FYoor, CoNTACTs 52-91 (4th ed. 1956).
134 Corbin, Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARv. L. REv. 449, 453
(1937).
'
3 5 See GEnmsw CiviL CoDE § 305.
136 See AusTmAx Crviir CODE arts. 865-82.
137 PORTUTGUESE CiviL CODE art. 643.
138 See Schiller, The Counterpart of Consideration in Foreign Legal Systems, in
NEw YoRK LAw RmsoN CommissioN REP ORT 187 (1936). In Louisiana both cause
and consideration are required. See Snelling, Cause and Consideration in Louisiana, 8
TuL. L. REv. 178 (1933).
139 Schiller, supra note 138.
140 In Conradie v. Rossouw, [19111 A.C. 279 (Cape Sup. Ct.) causa and considera-
tion were held to be identical concepts; both were eliminated from the law of contracts.
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prejudice to justice or certainty m the law of contracts is dis-
coverable.
1.41
The doctrines of causa or consideration, or even the absence of both
of these requirements, lead to fairly similar results in the enforcement
of promises. There are a growing number of cases in American law in
which consideration is dispensed with, such as action m reliance on a
promise 142 or the acceptance of consideration of nominal value; a
rent of a peppercorn has been held sufficient to raise a use on a bargain
and sale deed. 48 Most courts now enforce promises to pay for past
benefits conferred at the request of the promisor.'44 The Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides that written and signed offers are binding for
a period not exceeding three months, even without consideration. 45
Pound has listed numerous exceptions to the requirement of consid-
eration in equity '4 There are thus a large number of situations in
which consideration is not required for the enforcement of promises:
trusts, 147 charitable subscriptions, 48 gratuitous promises to convey land
followed by possession and improvements, 49 the firm offer,'50 taking of
security in the case of negotiable instruments although no value is
given,' 51 release of claims, 152 proises to pay barred debts, 5 3 infants'
contracts"' - and discharged clamis in bankruptcy, 5  inadequate con-
sideration,'5 " sealed instruments, 157 and promises reasonably inducing
141 Millner, Contrasts in Contract and Tort, 16 Cumim LEGAL PnoBLmfs 68, 72
(1963).
'42 RESTATEmENT, Coumcrrs § 90 (1932).
143 Barker v. Keete, 1 Free. 249, 2 Ventr. 35, 1 Mod. Rep. 262, 2 Mod. Rep. 249
(K.B. 1678).
144 See Webb v. McCowm, 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935) (enforced promise
of an annui ty to person injured saving pronnsor). Cf. Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 172,
7 N.E.2d 89 (1937).
14 5 UNWn RM COMMMCcL CODE § 2-205. See Sharp, Promises, Mistake and Reci-
procity, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 286 (1952); Symposium, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 777 (1941).
146 Pound, Consideration in Equity, 13 ILL. L. REv. 667 (1919).
'47 Id. at 668-69.
148 ConRN, CoNrTrncs § 198 (1963).
149 Neale v. Neale, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 1 (1869).
150 UNwom Coialmicrm. CoDE § 2-205.
'65 Kelso v. Ellis, 224 N.Y. 528, 536, 121 N.E. 364, 366 (1918).
152 Cairo R.R. v. United States, 267 U.S. 350 (1925); Rye v. Phillips, 203 Minn.
567, 282 N.W 459 (1938); Fned v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 196 At. 39 (1938).
'53 Mascot Oil Co. v. United States, 42 F.2d 309 (1930), aff'd, 282 U.S. 434 (1931).
154 Henry v. Root, 33 N.Y. 526 (1865); RESTATEmNT, CoNTRaCts § 89 (1932).
15 5 Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913).
156 Seymour v. Delancey, 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1824).
175 A seal imports consideration, even since enactment of N.Y. Civil Practice Act
§ 342 (1934). Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 172, 7 N.E.2d 89 (1937).
action. ""' An Italian jurist has expressed the opinion that the scope
of enforceable promises is larger in the common law than in the civil
law, where consideration is not required. 59 The many inroads into
the doctrine of consideration justify the expectation that, in the not
distant future, a uniform system of enforceable contracts may prevail
in most of the commercial countries. "[T]he history of the law of con-
tract throughout the world shows a gradual but steady progress to
the moral and economic approach, and recognizing the interest, both
individual and social in the performance of promises, deliberately
made, merely as such."160 Lord Denning has said that "the fundamental
[principle] of contract, which is that he who makes a promise should
keep it . is fundamental to all peoples. It is contained in the
Torah."' 6 ' Ordinarily, in Anglo-American law the adequacy of the con-
sideration is immaterial, both at common law and in equity 1.6 2 It has
been possible to enact a uniform sale of goods act in 1964 at the Hague
Conference on the Unification of Law Governing the International
Sale of Goods, after deliberations which had continued since 1935.
The convention has already been signed by six nations. 10
Negotiations Preliminary to the Formation
of the Contract
Good Faith
The law has progressed a long way since the fourth century B.C.,
when a Persian king could describe the Greek market as a place where
men might cheat one another under oath. In almost all the world's
legal systems, with the exception of Islamic law and the inner Anglo-
American common law (as distinguished from equity), much the same
standards of good faith are required in contractual negotiations as
in other institutions of social control-ethics, morals, and religion.
The legal origin of these ethical standards is found in the doctrine
of culpa m contrahendo of Roman law, which has been perpetuated in
the civil law.""- Fraud may consist in civil law of keeping secret that
15 8 RESTATEMNT, COcTRncrs § 90 (1932) (performance commenced mn reliance on
a promise).
159 0OnLA, IL CoNTArro (1955).
160 Pound, Promise or Bargain?, 33 TutL. L. REv. 455, 469 (1959).
161 Lord Denning, INTEnNATiONAL LAwams' CoNvEy oN n IsRAEL 58 (1958).
162 See Seymour v. Delancey, 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1824).
168 See Tune, The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 74 YALE L.J.
1409, 1413 (1965).
164 Prngshema, Aequitas und bona fides, m LE CTuRs FoR =HE Founm -m CENm-
TENAnY OF T=E PANDEcTS 183 (1931).
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which should be revealed;16 5 Ripert uses the striking phrase, "the
moralization of contracts."' 66 The appropriate criteria have been ex-
pressed in formulae which naturally differ from country to country
The German, 67 French,168 Swiss,169 Soviet170 and Austrian'71 codes
contain provisions which are broad enough to allow relief in cases in
which advantage has been taken of ignorance, mexperience or eco-
nomc distress. In Italian law, contractual negotiations must conform
to the rules of decency;172 as Del Vecchio has reminded us, quoting
Dante, "deceit . taints the whole world."1' 3 In German law the test
of good faith is tied to the norm of ordinary usage and to the require-
ment of absence of extreme disproportion in the exchanges.174 In
Russian law the test is "taking advantage of distress."175 In French law
mistake in value gives rise to rescission only in sales of land, 76 par-
tition of successions177 or contracts of an infant.78 Classic Roman law
granted the buyer a reduction in price where there were sales of
goods of lesser quality than was contemplated. 79 In Spanish 60 and
Philippine'8' law rescission is allowed for "insidious machinations."
The same general principle of good faith runs throughout the entire
gamut of Russian, Scandinavian, Hungarian and civil law, in spite of
differences in the formulae in which the concept is expressed and in
spite of differences of emphasis. The cases in which these different
formulae are applied are almost indistinguishable from one another,
165 Covia.no, ITA.IAN Cwmx LAw, GEaNERA SEaCToN 394 (2d ed. 1915); CicEno,
DE Osmcns, bk. III, e. 14-17. On bona fides in canon law see Hildenbrand, Geschichte der
Restimmungen des canonschen Rechts uber die bona fides bez der Ersitzung urd Klag-
verjahrung, in 36 Aacinv. Fra DIE Crvmismscm PRAxis 27 (1853).
166 Rn'anT, LA RELE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS Cirmms 92-93 (2d ed. 1927).
167 GERM.sAN CIVL CODE 1 138.
168 FRENCH Civm CODE art. 1116.
169 Swiss CIVIL CODE art. 2.
1T SOVIET CwI CODE art. 33 (as interpreted in art. 149).
171 AusvmtN CIVIL CODE art. 879(4).
172 ITALIAN CIVm CODE art. 1175.
173 Del Veccno, Truth and Untruth %n Morals and Law, 39 IowA L. REv. 16, 52
(1953).
'74 GERMAN CWL CODE § 138.
'7 5 SOVIET CIvI. CODE art. 149.
176 FaRNcua CIxVI CODE art. 1674.
177 FBaiNun CrriL CODE art. 887.
1
78 FmNca Crvm CODE art. 1305.
179 Buc r xi & McNAru, ROMAN LAw AN COMMON LAW 211 (2d ed. rev. by
Lawson 1965).
180 SPANis CVIL CODE art. 1269.
181 Civm CODE OF =ma PHaLIPINEs art. 1338 (Garcia y Alba 1952).
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and in most instances the same results could have been reached had
the formulae of other legal systems been applied.1
2
In the common law, in both England and the United States, full
disclosure of all material facts is required in insurance contracts, in
all contracts of suretyship and in all dealings between persons in a
fiduciary relationship. 183 In some situations, such as dealings between
a trustee and a beneficiary, the presence of the confidential relation-
ship imposes the duty of uberrzmae fides.-8 In other situations, com-
plete good faith is required only in cases arising in equity, which under
the common law system means, in substance, cases in which the plain-
tiff is entitled to specific relief in the form of specific performance or
injunctive relief. Thus, there exists in Anglo-American law the anom-
alous situation that the only circumstances which (require complete
good faith are suits for specific relief or cases involving a confidential
relationship; 8 5 although everyone agrees that the form of remedy
which is available has nothing to do with the relevance of the require-
ment of good faith to the solution of the controversy and that there
is no good reason for confining the application of the requirement of
good faith to situations in which a confidential relationship is present.'
In Islamic law a party who has suffered something to his great dis-
advantage is nevertheless without legal relief, except against flagrant
misrepresentation in a sale.' 87 In civil law' and Scots law,8 9 which is
based primarily on civil law but displays the influence of common law
doctrine, there is an overriding duty of good faith. The Restatement
of Contracts continues the unfortunate doctrine that the remedy for
unconscionable conduct is confined to the denial of specific relief,
when such relief is requested by the party who has been guilty of
unconscionable conduct.'
Contracts of Adhesion
Form contracts, or contracts of adhesion, are those contracts pre-
sented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by a person who is in a position
(often the result of a partial monopoly) of great economic superiority
'.8 2 See NEWmAN, EQurry AND LAW" A COPARATIVE STUDY ch. VII (1961).
383 See CEEsmm & FmFooT, CoNTRACTs 229 (4th ed. 1956).
i84 See Scorr, TRuSTS § 170.25 (2d ed. 1956).
185 BOCERT, Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CoRNE.L
L.Q. 237 (1928).
186 See CuAvEE, SoME PnOBLEMS OF EQUITY 30 (1950).
187 ME)JELLE art. 356.
188 GERmAN CIvIL CODE §§ 157, 242; FREN H Civrm CODE art. 1109.
189 GLOAG, CoNTRACTs 229, 302 (2d ed. 1929).
190 REsTATEmENT, CoNrAcTs § 367a (1932).
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The doctrine of relief from such contracts is far more widely used in
civil law than in the inner Anglo-American common law The doctrine
originated in France in 1901.191 A French ]urist, Bipert, explains the
doctrine on the ground that consent involves discussion of the terms
of a contract, but a contract of adhesion, dictated by superior economic
power and with resulting harshness to the adversary party, is not really
contractual but is the expression of a "private authority " If there is
a will, it is, according to Bipert, "a weak sort of will." 92 Form contracts
are dealt with in specific provisions of the Italian Civil Code. 93 One-
sided clauses must be separately approved in writing, and the Code
gives a list of such clauses.'9 Enlargement of the code provisions by
analogy is not allowed.' 95 The French decisions confine relief to the
elimination of clauses which are found to be unfair. The same limita-
tion is also evident in Italian and Israeli 95 law The fiction that the
party would not have agreed to the clauses if he had known of them
seems to underlie both the French and Italian solutions. If a contract
was signed without knowing of certain clauses and was prepared by
the other, more powerful party, the contract, in other civil law juris-
dictions, may be rescinded. In view of the breadth of the Italian
statute,197 it seems probable that the relief will, before long, be ex-
tended to cases in which the clauses are known by the party who is
in the inferior bargaining position. Contracts of adhesion are usually
enforced, although sometimes reluctantly, in Anglo-American law 198
Relief is occasionally given in equity 199 It is provided in the Uniform
Commercial Code that the court can strike out unconscionable clauses
or re]ect the entire contract. It is stated in the comment to the Code
that "the principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power. '2 0 The doctrine has been applied more
191 SALarE, DEcLAnATiON iE VOLENTE 129-30 (1901).
192 BPaT, LA REGLE moRALE, DANS LEs OBLIGATIONS crvirs No. 63 (4th ed. 1949).
193 ITALIAN CVm CODE arts. 1341, 1342, 1370.
194 ITALIAN CWI CODE art. 1341.
195 Corla, Form Contracts, 11 Am. J. Comm. L. 1, 20 (1962).
10 Statute of Standard Contracts, May 11, 1964 (Israel).
'97 ITALIAN CrVL CoDE art. 1341.
10s Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); Streich v.
General Motors Corp., 5 M1. App. 2d 485, 126 N.E.2d 389 (1955).
199 In Baedeker & Associates v. Hamtrack State Bank, 257 Mich. 435, 241 N.W 249
(1932) specific performance was denied in the case of a contract which was drawn to
look like an application for listing but was really a subscription contract.
200 UNwon Comnmnc&r CoDE § 2-302, comment. American Home Improvement
Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); see Note, 78 HLv. L. Rzv. 895
(1965).
restrictively in England, where a court has refused to permit evidence




In Roman law the doctrine of duress was limited to physical coer-
cion tested by the standard of a person capable of the greatest endur-
ance.20 2 In French law the doctrine is broadened so as to apply the
test of the degree of pressure which would be effective against a
reasonable person, even though the pressure is confined to threats
against his person or property 213 In England physical duress was ex-
tended to economic duress in the eighteenth century 204 In German law
the doctrine of duress is tied to the standard of good morals defined
in the Civil Code.20 ' There is a strict application of the doctrine of
economic duress, so that it must threaten the economic existence of
the weaker party 208 The provisions of the German Civil Code which
establish the general standards of exploitation of the necessity, thought-
lessness or inexperience of another, so as to produce economic advan-
tage creating a striking disproportion in value of the counter-perfor-
mance, tie the test of duress to the test of the fair exchange.07
The Fair Exchange
In France and Germany condemnation of economic duress is an
instrument for insuring a fair exchange of values. The problem of the
fair equivalence of the exchanges must be considered in any com-
parative discussion of the enforceability of promises. The doctrine,
under the name of laeszo enormis, existed in Roman law In the time of
Diocletian the seller of land could rescind the sale if the price was less
than half the value. The doctrine was taken into the canon law under
the name of the fair exchange. Extreme disproportion in the exchanges
justifies rescission in the law of Hungary208 and Poland.20 9 In French
law objective disproportion, without fault or exploitation, has no effect
201 L'Estrange v. F Graucob, Ltd., [1934] 2 K.B. 394.
202 See Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German
Law, 11 TL. L. RFv. 345, 362 (1937).
2 0s FhE~cH Civii CODE art. 1112.
2o4 Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 915, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B. 1732); see Dawson,
Economic Duress: An Essay in Perspective, 45 MicH. L. RBv. 253, 256 (1947).
205 GERN CivH. CODE §§ 123, 138 (applied to requirement contracts).
206 See Dawson, Economic Duress, 12 Tt.L. L. REv. 42, 62 (1937).
2 0 7 
GEm-&- CsvH. CODE § 138.
208 Case No. 7428 Magan]ogL Dontvenytar [M.D.] (1932); Case No. 2044 M.D.
(1932); Hungarian Civil Code of 1928 (unenacted) art. 1002.
2 09 POLISH CIviL CODE art. 42.
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on ordinary contracts.2 10 In Germany a price-value differential of at
least one-half is utilized as a measure of lack of fairness, but the courts
have applied the standard of the ordinary market price when such a
criterion is available.211 The doctrine applies to sales of either goods or
nmmovables and, when applicable, renders the contract void. In
French law the test of the fair exchange is confined to suits for par-
tition of succession,212 suits by minors213 and suits for rescission of
sales of land brought by the seller,214 as in Roman law, and is fixed
at a mathematical ratio of five-twelfths of the value of the counter-
performance. In German law duress is available to either the seller or
buyer.
In the United States, where the courts are less concerned with a
fair equivalence, the factor of economic compulsion assumes more
importance than in the civil law In equity inadequacy of consideration
is usually deemed insufficient in itself for denying specific performance,
but it has been made a defense in suits for specific relief by statute in
Califorma, Montana, North Dakota and Georgia. In most American
jurisdictions gross inadequacy of consideration raises a presumption of
fraud, especially when coupled with weakness of bargaining position.
In Califorma the ratio has been deemed unconscionable if the value
is not more than two-thirds of the price.215 Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, it has been held that a contract is unconscionable where
the value of goods or services is less than half the cost.2 16 It has been
suggested that the Uniform Commercial Code be used as a basis for
the extension of this doctrine to other branches of law
Whenever an unfair bargain has been made by reason of trickery,
failure to disclose, superiority of economic position or actual duress,
and a gross inadequacy in the value of the exchanges has resulted,
most legal systems, with the exception of the inner Anglo-American
common law and Islamic law, usually give relief to the weaker party to
210 Judgment of Dec. 20, 1952, [1953] Recueil P noclique et Critique I. 95, (19531
Recueil Sirey I. 101 (Cass. civ.).
211 See Dawson, supra note 206, at 57.
2 12 FEN CH Clvm CoD. arts. 887, 1079.
21S FENcH CiviL CODE: art. 1305.
2 1 4 
FnEN-" CIvIL CODE art. 1674.
215 Comblith v. Valentine, 211 Cal. 243, 294 Pac. 1065 (1930) suggests that a
value of two-thirds of the price is an unconscionable ratio. Von Mehren, Civil Law
Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARv. L. REv.
1009, 1066, n.234 (1959); see McDermott v. Lindquist, 66 Colo. 88, 179 Paec. 147
(1919) (contract made under pressure).
216 American Home Improvement Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964); see Note, 78 HAnv. L. REv. 895 (1965).
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the transaction. Essentially the same standards of decent and honorable
conduct are inposed in most of the legal systems of the world.
Implied Warranty
Related to the requirement of disclosure in good faith is the doc-
trine of implied warranty in sales of goods. In Roman law, even after
the end of the Republic, a seller was liable only for fraud or express
warranty "Roman law, like other systems, began with the principle
that no liability attached to the seller for defects m the thing sold,
whether or not they were noticeable at the time of the sale; the buyer
bought the thing 'as it was.",2,7 Even fraudulent concealment did not
make the seller liable until the end of the Republic. Cicero first raised
the question of good faith in contracting in his discussion of the case
of a corn merchant who had observed other ships sailing with ship-
ments of corn for a beleagured city; should he, before selling his cargo,
impart his information about other shipments approaching the city,
or keep the fact to himself and sell his cargo at the prevailing famine
price? Two Stoic philosophers reached contrary opinions.218 Cicero
felt that it was the moral duty of the seller of a house infested with
vermin to disclose the fact to his prospective buyer. It had been law
since the Twelve Tables that if a seller of imovables makes a formal
oral declaration which is untrue he must pay a double penalty 212 From
the beginning of the Empire to the end of the classical period, in the
third century, a seller was liable for non-disclosure of legal defects,
such as the existence of a public tax or a private annual toll, which
were known to the seller and affected the property 220 Where the defect
2 1 7 Buaurjzm, THE MAiN INSTTruTiONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 272 (1931);
JOLOvCcz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 307 (2d ed. 1961); Rabel, The
Nature of Warranty of Quality, 24 TuL. L. REv. 273 (1950).
2 18 CIcEno, De Ofciis ill. 50. See STEIN, FAULT IN TE FORMATrIoN OF CONTRACT IN
RoM AN Iw ScoTs WAz (1958). The seller was liable for non-disclosure of legal defects,
e.g., servitudes. Beseler, DE JurE Cnwmi TuLwo DICE AD NAT"RAm nEcoc, mo 324-29
(1931). There was therefore a liability on the seller for non-disclosure of legal defects.
In classical law, from the beginning of the Empire to 235 A.D., there was the same rule,
DIGEST 19.1.21, 19.1.41, failure to inform a buyer of a public tax or of a private annual
toll of which the seller knew. In the case of movables, failure to declare specified faults
(in sales of slaves or cattle) whether known to the seller or not, made him liable; applied
only to sales in the markets (Aediles' Edict). In the law of Justiman, the Aedilian Edict
was extended to all sales of movables, by the compilers. See DGEST 50.16.195.3. There
is no authentic text, according to STEIN, op. cit. supra at 54, which applies to mimovables.
The references are probably, according to Stem, spurious. Also in the law of Justiman,
cases in which the classical law gave the buyer no remedy were covered by an enlarged
concept of error in substantia. See DE ZULxETA, TEE ROMN LAW OF SALE 26 (1945).
219 DIGEST 9.1.1.1.
220 STEIN, op. cit. supra note 218, at 54.
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was unknown to the seller, his liability was at first limited to specific
categories of property, such as slaves or cattle, winch were sold in
markets. In the law of Justiman the liability was extended to all sales
of movable property It is thought that there is no authentic text ap-
plying to immovables, and the references to such liability are probably
interpolations by the compilers. An action could be brought for rescis-
sion for defects known to the seller, in actio redhibitorsa, or for a rebate
in the price, in the actio quanti mrnorts.
Caveat emptor was never a part of the civil law 221 In that legal
system the basic doctrine was responsibility for defects.
In voluntary and mutual transactions those who deal with each other
owe each other sincerity, so that they may understand to what they
have pledged themselves, the fidelity of execution and all that which
may result from such a transaction. So the seller must declare truth-
fully the quality of has wares. 222
The French Civil Code provides that a vendor warrants against hidden
defects which make the thing sold unfit for the intended use or which
would have caused the purchaser to reject the sale. 223 The German
Civil Code contains similar provisions. 2 4 Although the view is held by
some writers that delivery fulfills the seller's obligations,22 5 the Euro-
pean codes generally provide for rescission for defects which defeat
the contemplated use.226 Rescission is allowed for absence of fitness
for the usual or intended use, regardless of the seller's knowledge or
ignorance of the defect, in French, 22  German,"8 Italian,229 Swiss,230
Scandinavian,2 1 Austrian 32 and Brasilian 33 law
In the common law the approach to the problem of responsibility
on the part of the seller was precisely the opposite, and the doctrine
which later came to be known as caveat emptor prevailed, relieving
the seller except for fraudulent representations. Implied warranties
221 Id. at 52-53.
2 22 DomA, TBE Civi. LAw INTS NATuRAL ORnE 11 (Cushng ed. 1853).
223 Fnac Cwn CODE art. 1641.
224 GpMA. CIVI CODE § 459.
2 25 ENNEccEaus-L , REr DER SCHULDVERHALTNESSE § 1121.
226 AusTRAN CrnL CODE arts. 922, 932; BRAsILIA CiwL CODE art. 1102; GmuEAN
Civir CODE § 459; FRENcH CIL CODE art. 1643.
227 FBENcH Cmvm CODE arts. 1603, 1643.
228 GERMA CIVr CODE § 459(2).
2 29 ITALIAN CxVIi CODE art. 1492.
230 CODE DEs O LiGATIONS art. 107 (Switzerland 1937) [hereinafter cited as Swiss
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS].
281 Sc NAViAN SALES LAw § 43(3).
232 AusarAN& Cvnm CODE arts. 922, 932 (second sentence).
233 BRAsmm- CxrvI CODE art. 1102.
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began to be recognized in England early in the seventeenth century.
Since then, the development of the action in assumpsit has provided
a remedy for breach of implied warranties to a wide extent, although
perhaps not as widely as in some of the civil law countries. 234 The Urn-
form Commercial Code provides in section 2-314 for implied warranty
of fitness for ordinary purposes and in section 2-315 for particular
purposes.
In Roman law there was no implied warranty of generic, that is,
non-specific goods. This was also true in common law2" In European
law there is still some distinction between sales of specific and generic
goods. In the case of generic goods there is no implied warranty, but
a process of assimilation has been noted by Kessler.36
"Behind the bewildering and frequently conflicting technical de-
tails, a tendency towards convergence in the treatment of latent defects
of quality is clearly visible." s T The civil law and the common law
agree in substance on the test of responsibility for quality- fitness for
ordinary purposes and for the particular purpose envisaged by the
buyer.
The Effect of Unilateral Mistake
In Roman law error in substantia was exactly what the expression
means literally; error as to the material of which the object was com-
posed. The Roman doctrine of mistake proceeded on the assumption
that there are inherent qualities of things which determine their iden-
tity, and error was not material unless it involved the nature of the
thing.2 8 Pothier, whose studies in Roman law became, thirty-three
years after his death, the basis of the Napoleonic Code, enlarged the
Roman doctrine to include the subjective criterion of substance as a
234 See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLtm. L. REv. 699
(1936).
235See Le Viness, Caveat Emptor versus Caveat Venditor, 7 MD. L. REV. 177, 182
(1943).
236 IKessler, Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YAI.n L.J. 262,
266 (1964); GERMAN CoMmERCIAL CODE § 378; see 86 Entscheidungen des Reichs-
genchts in Zivilsachen (RGZ) 90 (1914); UNIFRM CommncAIL CODE § 2-601; Um-
ForM LAw ON TEE INTEMNATIONAL SALE OF GoOns art. 33. On the English law of war-
ranty of quality see Babel, The Nature of Warranty of Quality, 24 TurL. L. Env. 473
(1950); 15 MODE N L. REv. 425 (1952); 16 MODEnN L. REV. 174 (1953).
237 Kessler, supra note 236, at 269.
2
3s Silving, The Unknown and the Unknowable in Law, 35 CALIF. L. Ray. 352
(1947); SoxoLowsxi, DIE PaiLOsoi'HIE np Pmv rmCwT 238 (1902). Error in a quality
of the object of the contract was not a ground for rescission because it was not regarded
as preventing a meeting of the wills. BucxLAND, McNAm & LAwsoN, RomAx LAw AND
CoMMoN LAw 200 (2d ed. 1952).
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quality of the object considered essential by the parties to the con-
tract, even though not affecting the identity of the subject matter's"
The conceptual approach to the validity of bilateral, or synallag-
matic, contracts is precisely opposite in civil and common law Until
about a hundred years ago the subjective test of contractual intent
prevailed in England. The objective intent has found a somewhat
fortuitous anchorage m American law from the fact that the foremost
exponent of the theory, Professor Williston, was the principal reporter
for the Restatement of Contracts of 1932, in which the primacy of the
objective test found authoritative expression. As Williston himself
has pointed out, "results under the subjective theory of contractual
acts, where great importance is placed upon the meeting of the minds
of the parties, will be materially different from results under the ob-
jective theory, which emphasizes their expressions." 240 In the common
law rescission for mutual mistake is allowed only where both parties
were mistaken concerning an essential fact, the existence of which was
assumed by both parties as the basis for contracting. What is fre-
quently overlooked is that the fact that the party against whom rescis-
sion is requested was also mistaken has no bearing on the right of the
mistaken party to rescind. The principal object in contracting is rarely
the same on both sides, and the mistake will almost always be harmful
to only one of the parties, that is, the one who for that reason asks for
rescission. A vendor is not harmed by the mistaken belief that the land
he is selling has a gold mine in it, and the right of the vendor to rescind,
if he wished to do so, has no bearing on the right of the buyer, the
only one who has been harmed by the mistake, to do so. Rescission is
allowed for unilateral mistake only when the mistake was known to
or recognizable by the other party to the contract.
French law starts with the basic principle that "there is no valid
consent if consent was given by error."241 Predominating effect is given
to the subjective intent on the basic principle that the formation of
a contract rests primarily on the actual intention of the parties;242 a
contract is voidable by one who has been mistaken about a matter
230 "Error annuls the agreement, not only when it affects the identity of the subject,
but also when it affects that quality of the subject, winch the parties have principally in
contemplation, and which makes the substance of it." POTHIa, Tw'-nL DES OBLIGATIONS
10 (Evans transl. 1826). PoTHmR, TBEATISES ON CIVIL AND CBMUNAL PROCEDUBE 312
(1809), published posthumously, advocated the extension of relief in all cases of lesion,
or serious harm. This suggestion was not accepted by the codifiers.
24o Williston, unsigned note, 35 HAnv. L. BEV. 757, 758 (1922).
2 4 1 FBENC CIVI CODE art. 1109.
242 6 pLANiIOL & RIPERT, TRAni PSCTiQUE DU DRorr CrvL FRANCAS No. 103
(1952).
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wich was an mducmg factor in contracting or in incorporating an
important provision. This principle has been described by Planiol as
"the source of assuring a minimum of commutative justice in agree-
ments."243 The law protects an injured party when the contract be-
comes relatively useless to him because of his error. In Article 1110 of
the French Civil Code, "substance" takes the meaning not only of
qualities of the object which determine its category, mistake as to
winch would prevent the formation of any contract at all, but also
of substantial qualities of the object, mistake as to winch would not
prevent the contract from coming into existence. 244 Substance means
not only the matter of the object but also its qualities if they are
envisaged as of decisive importance. Article 1131 of the French Civil
Code enlarged Pothier's definition of error by providing that an obliga-
tion based on a false cause is void. The French doctrine of cause is
inseparably related to error in contracting, since contracts are fre-
quently annulled where there was only error in motive or as to the
effect of the contract: for example, a contract to make good damage
for which the promisor erroneously believed that he was responsible
would be annulled.2 45 A clear case of error in motive is a contract by
a consumer to pay for a long electric connection, not knowing that a
shorter connection is available.248
The upshot of the historical development of the theory of con-
tractual obligation in the two master systems is that their conceptual
approach to the validity of bilateral, or synallagmatic, contracts is
precisely opposite. The common law is firmly committed to the prin-
ciple that contractual responsibility is to be determined according
to the outward expression of intent.247 Tins objective test requires en-
243 Id. No. 243, at 303.
244 GAB3A, Contributo allo dottnna defl'errore in diritto ciile italiano, Grouzsitr-
DmZA ITALIANA c0l. 677 (1900). The first paragraph of Article 1110 of the Italian Civil
Code incorporates the same provision that appears in Article 1110 of the French Civil
Code.
245Judgment of July 1, 1924, [1926] Recueil PWiodique et Critique I. 27 (Cass.
req.).
246 Judgment of Jan. 19, 1925, [1925] Recuell G6n6ral de Lois et des Arr~ts I. 101,
[1925] Da~loz Hebdomedaire 77 (Cass. req.). Accord, Judgment of Nov. 17, 1930,
[1932] Recueil C6n6ral de Lois et des Arr~ts I. 17, [1931] Dalloz Hebdomedaire 92 (Cass.
civ.) (agreement for settlement of an inheritance rescinded because plaintiff was ignorant
of a will in his favor). In [1905] Recueil G6n6ral de Lois et des Arr6ts I. 212 rescission
was allowed of a contract of sale of a patented drug in ignorance of the fact that the
defendant's patent had expired. Errors of law are included by implication in art. 1110 of
the French Civil Code. See Corphe, Le Principe de la bonne foi (Th&se Pans 1928).
247Leamed Hand, J., in Hotc kiss v. National City Bank, 200 Fed. 287, 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1911) stated: "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the
[Vol. 18
March, 1967] SIMILARITY OF DOCTBINES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS 513
forcement even in cases of unilateral mistake if the mistake was not
recognizable, and even if the unilateral mistake was recognizable,
enforcement is required, unless it was a mistake m respect to basic
presuppositions which would have justified rescission if the mistake
had been mutual. Even where the other party had knowledge of the
mistake, a large and possibly prevailing body of authority denies relief
if the mistake was due to negligence.248 Since mistake is usually due to
negligence, this qualification precludes rescission in almost all cases of
unilateral mistake, although some cases, without stressing the point,
have allowed rescission even where negligence was present.249 Relief
even for mutual mistake is rejected in English law 250
In the legal systems of the countries of continental Europe no
distinction is made between mutual and unilateral mistake.251 In all
civil law systems, except the Portuguese,252 the test of enforceability
is the subjective intent of the parties. But in order to preclude capri-
cious rescission, there is, in most civil law countries, a requirement
that the mistake, to justify rescission, must have been recognizable.
253
There are various tests of recognizability Even in the common law,
unilateral mistake is ground for rescission under many circumstances
personal, or individual, intent of the parties." Holmes, J., in O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145
Mass. 461, 463, 14 N.E. 747, 751 (1888) stated: "Assent, in the sense of the law, is a
matter of overt acts, not of inward unanimity in motives, design, or the interpretation of
words." WmrsToN, CONTRACrS § 20, at 35 (rev. ed. 1957) states: "The fact that the maui-
festation was made under a mistake will not prevent the formation of the contract."
248 Abbott, Mistake of Fact as a Ground for Affirmative Equitable Relief, 23 HARv.
L. Rev. 608, 617 (1910); Cleaveland v. Richardson, 132 U.S. 318 (1889); Steinmeyer v.
Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 80 N.E. 564 (1907); Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot, 142 Wis. 279,
124 N.W 264 (1910); Durkee v. Durkee, 59 Vt. 70, 8 At. 490 (1887); see Williams v.
Spurr, 24 Mich. 335, 350 (1872); Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 765
(2d Cir. 1946); Ashworth v. Cbarlesworth, 119 Utah 650, 231 P.2d 724, 727 (1951).
Williston, op. cit. supra note 247, § 1577 would bar recission where the plaintiff was
negligent. See Comment, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 725,729 n.25 (1950).
249 3 CoRBn;, CONTRACrs § 606 n.2 (1963). Sawyer v. Mid-Continental Petroleum
Corp., 236 F.2d 518, 521 (10th Cir. 1956); Rushlight Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. City of
Portland, 189 Ore. 194, 219 P.2d 732 (1950). Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral
Mistake, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 859, 885 (1928) feels that negligence is really irrelevant.
250 See Lawson, Error m Substantia, 52 L.Q. REv. 79, 97 (1936); Smith v. Hughes,
L.R. 6 Q.B. 597 (1871).
251 "The distinction between unilateral and bilateral mistakes is entirely foreign to
the Roman and civil law." ABMINJON, VON NoLDE & WOLP, Tn rri DE DRorr coMPAmB
civil No. 13 (1950). Thayer, Unilateral Mistake and Unjust Enrwhment as a Ground for
the Avoidance of Legal Transactions, HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 467 (1934).
252 See PORTUGUESE CVrL CODE arts. 659-60.
253 Meymal, Book Review of SArtrixs, DE LA DEcLARATION DE LA VOLONT-, M 1
REvuE TR .L DE n aorr crvim 545, 568 (1902). The reviewer points out that in
French law the defendant must have "soupcon" (suspicion) to avoid sanctioning pure
individual caprice, and leaving the contractor at the mercy of the declarant.
if the mistake was recognizable.25 It cannot be questioned that the
subjective approach results in the allowance of rescission in cases of
unilateral mistake to a considerably greater extent than in Anglo-
American common law, where the objective test prevails. Tins is largely
due to the fact that the basic presupposition test of the common law
requires that the mistake must concern a fundamental expectation of
the contracting party Under the test of recognizability in several civil
law countries, -the nature of excusable error is determined by objective
standards, winch allow rescission only for mistake in matters winch
would ordinarily be regarded, by reasonable standards, as essential in
business dealings; 55 these standards bring about results closely similar
to those reached by the objective test of common law. As Corbin has
pointed out, unless the mistake concerns a matter winch would be
regarded as essential by a man who is reasonable, the other party would
not be likely to know about it.256
In actual practice, the requirement of recognizability goes far to
reduce the difference in result produced by the seemingly irrecon-
cilable differences between the objective and subjective approaches
to contractual obligation. The difference is not one of generically dif-
ferent concepts but of divergent views as to the application of concepts
which are fairly closely related. There is no difference in result be-
tween civil law and the inner system of equity m Anglo-American law;
both systems allow relief for unilateral mistake with the same liberal-
ity, except that equity in Anglo-American law confines relief to the
denial of specific performance against the party who was mistaken.2 57
2 S4 Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Welsbrod, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 2d 278, 285 P.2d 989
(1955); 5 WmLsvoN, op. cit. supra note 247, §§ 1573, 1557 n.2. "[Tjhe mistake, though
unilateral, makes enforcement unjust." 3 CousiN, CoNTRAcTs § 610, at 695 (1960).
Awnmrjo, voN NOLDE & WOLFF, op. cit. supra note 251, at 445.
2 5 5 GEUA Crvix. CODE § 119(2); Swiss CoE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 24; HUNGARIAN
Cvim CODE OF 1928 (unenacted) art. 1002; PoLisH CrvIL COPE art. 37. In Polish law the
test of matters which would be regarded as decisive m ordinary business dealings is coin-
bined with the test of recognizability.
256 4 CoRBiN, CoNTAcTs § 906 (1960).
257 CEMus, SOrN P B MS OF EQurr 26 (1950)- "[lIt is well known that some
types of mistake are probably not serious enough to offset an agreement although they
make equity decline to enforce it." For a collection of cases see Newman, op. cit. supra
note 182, at 119 n.11. In Mansell v. Lord Lumber & Fuel Co., 348 Ill. 140, 180 N.E.
774 (1932) the vendor by mistake failed to provide m the contract that the conveyance
was subject to unpaid installments of assessments for improvements. Although the court
demed specific performance at the suit of the purchaser, rescission was also demed even
though the purchaser knew that the vendor thought the contract contained such a provi-
sion. See Burkhalter v. Jones, 32 Kan. 5, 3 Pac. 559 (1884); Mansfield v. Sherman, 81
Me. 365, 17 AUt. 300 (1889); Day v. Wells, 30 Beav. 220, 54 Eng. Rep. 872 (Rolls Ct.
1861), (per Sir John Romilly, M.R.). For collection of cases see 3 CoRuns, CorRacars
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In equity specific performance will be demed in cases of unilateral
mistake even due to the negligence of the defendant. 28 The only im-
portant impediment to the complete reconciliation of the treatment of
unilateral mistake is the failure of the inner Anglo-American common
law to receive the equitable test of excusable error, winch is received
throughout the civil law world with few exceptions. The lag between
the Anglo-American legal system and the civil law in the allowance
of relief for unilateral mistake is due to the failure of the inner common
law system to receive the principles of equity
French law requires that a mistake of motive may entail the avoid-
ance of a contract provided the defendant was aware or should have
been aware of the plaintiff's motive in contracting and provided the
defendant knew or should have known that the motive was of decisive
importance to the party who was mistaken. Tins requirement is clearly
a different test of recogmzability than the requirement in other Euro-
pean systems that the mistake must have been mutual or known to
the other party or recognizable by him. In Switzerland, although Ar-
ticle 24 of the Swiss Code of Obligations states that error in motive
is not essential error, the decisions of the Federal Tribunal have per-
mitted rescission for error of motive.259 In Austrian law, a 1917 amend-
ment to Article 871 of the Civil Code provides for rescission for mis-
take in an essential quality when the intent was clearly expressed, but
]urisprudence has enlarged the effect of the amendment to include
error of a less direct sort. The unenacted Hungarian Civil Code of
1928, winch was nevertheless followed by the courts up to the enact-
ment of a Soviet Code in 1959, has been enlarged by judicial decision
as to the scope of excusable error.6 0
§ 612 (1960). In Missouri River, F.S. & G.R.R. v. Bnckley, 21 Kan. 275 (1878) specific
performance was demed for non-disclosure of a deposit of coal known to the purchaser.
258 3 Con;, CONTRACTS § 612 (1960); see PoiEmmoy, EQUiTY JURiSPRUDENCE § 868
(5th ed. 1941). The cases are usually such that considerable hardship would result from
specific performance.
259 Oehrli v. Graf-Oehrli, 43 Arrets du Tribunal F6d6ral Suisse, Recueil Officiel
[ATF] 1I. 579, [1918] Journal des Tribunaux [J. Trib.] 610 (1917); 47 ATF 1I. 86,
[1921] J. Trib. 423 (1921); Hagler-Rickli v. jaggi S.A., 48 ATF H. 236, [1922] J. Trib.
488 (1922); 53 ATF II. 35, [1927] J. Trib. 331 (1927); see Arnould freres v. Nussberger,
50 ATF H1. 313 (1924); 55 ATF II. 184, [1930] J. Trib. 86 (1929); Kuhn et consorts
v. Klesel et consorts, 43 ATF H. 775 (1917). See also Applications Electnques Frigidaires
S.A. v. Maurer, 57 ATF 1I. 284, [1932] J. Trib. 87 (1931), where the seller should
have taken into account the fact that the length of the fnigidaire was an essential element,
as it was too long to fit into the intended place; Pletscher v. Geiser, 80 ATF 11. 152,
[1955] J. Trib. 130 (1955); Cuenod, Delimitation du domame de rerreur dans les
contrats en droit Suisse de obligation (Th&se Lausanne 1941).
260 No. 18, XIV B Sz (Feb. 9, 1932). Negligence does not bar rescission in Hun-
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The German test of "Verkehranschauung," or the business point of
view,261 the Swiss test of commercial loyalty,26 2 the Italian test of
mistake which could have been detected by a person using ordinary
diligence,268 the Polish test of what would be regarded as decisive
under normal circumstances,2 64 and the Hungarian test of what is
regarded by general belief as unportant265 all establish very siniilar
criteria of the kind of mistake for which rescission will be allowed.
Even the French subjective test of suspicion of the motive in contract-
mg reaches results not very unlike those winch are produced by the
objective tests, probably for the reason pointed out by Corbin. The
decisions of the German Reichsgericht, which originally insisted on
a rigid interpretation of the test of ordinary business usage in determin-
ing the materiality of the error, have shown a clear tendency to modify
the objective test of recognizability so as to include error in what are
called by the courts "neutral" characteristics of the subject matter. 6
This approaches the wider French test which allows rescission in cases
of mere suspicion of the adversary's motive in entering into the con-
tract. In accordance with what appears to be an inevitable progression
across the entire civil law in the concept of substantial error, the
Reichsgericht developed a formula that characteristics include not
only physical characteristics but also qualities, whether factual or
legal, of the subject matter of the contract affecting its value according
to the prevailing opinion in the market and because of the normal
duration of those qualities.26 According to Staudinger, however, the
formula of the court has not clearly discarded the test of the qualities
which tend to identify the object.268 The bewildering diversity of
approach to the problem of what effect is to be given to unilateral
mistake should not be allowed to obscure the underlying concept of
good faith which has burst the restraints, established from time to
ganan law. [1927] BJ B1. 4 (Jan. 5, 1927). Case No. 3795 M.D. (1902); Case No. 128
M.D. (1908); Case No. 227 M.D. (1933); Case No. 2044 M.D. (1932); Case No. 6003
M.D. (1931).
261 GERMAN Crvm CODE §§ 119(2), 157.
262 SwIss CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 24.
263 ITALIAN CIviL CODE art. 1431.
2 64 PoLisn CIL CODE art. 37.
265 Hu' rAN Cxvr, CODE OF 1928 (unenacted) art. 1002.
266 161 Entscheidungen des Relchsgenchts m Zivilsachen [RGZJ 193 (1939); 95
RGZ 60 (1918); 64 RGZ 266, 268 (1906). The name of the court is now the Bundes-
genchtshof. STAUDINGER, KomnmNT.R Zum Buunr. c nims GESETZBUcH 636 (1957).
Cf., [1912] Junstische Wochenschrift [J.W.] No. 2, at 850.
267 64 RGZ 266, 268 (1906).
268 STAuDiNGE, KouiwNTAn ZUm BuRO EInICnEs GESETZBUCE 636 (1957).
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time in different parts of the world, on the application of the equitable
concept.
Reliance Interest Damages
The main obstacle to the reconciliation of the solutions winch have
been reached in common law and civil law lies m the difference in
the measure of damages for rescission. In the legal systems of the
countries of continental Europe, where no distinction is made between
mutual and unilateral mistake, relief is granted in a wide range of
situations, under suitable safeguards to protect the adversary party
against damage arising out of his reliance on the outward manifesta-
tion of intent. The civil law treatment of mistake apportions the loss.
The person seeking relief, while not defeated by a change of position
of the adversary party, must compensate hun for any actual loss but
not for anticipated profits. The recognition of this right to damages
for actual injury is largely the bridge between the equity of the mis-
taken party to be relieved from responsibility for the consequences of
his uninformed intent to contract and the equity of the party who
relied on the contract.
In Swiss law, damages to cover the actual loss due to the reliance
interest, "Vertrauensmterresse," are recoverable, 6 9 but the court in
its discretion may award greater damages.270 In German 71 and Greek 72
law, no greater amount can be claimed for the reliance interest than
the value of the benefit which would have been derived from the
contract as it had been made. In Greek,273 ItalianF74 and Swiss 275 law,
the other party may accept the expression of intent as it was under-
stood by the party who was mistaken; tls is also true in Anglo-
American equity 
276
In the common law there is no intermediate remedy to cover the
reliance interest. The Restatement of Contracts provides that "a trans-
action.. is voidable except where it is possible by compensation
to the party injured by the mistake to put him in as good a position
as if the transaction had been what he supposed it to be, and such
2 69 SWisS CoE oF OBLIA ONs art. 26.
27o Grandchamp v. Juguenim, 64 ATF II. 9, 11939] J. Trib. 158 (1938).
2 71 
GmuAAN CIVm CoDE § 122.
2 72 Cnr CoD, art. 145 (Greece 1940) [hereinafter cited as GrEEX CIVIL CODE].
273 GBim= Civm CoDE art. 144.
274 ITALIAN Crvm CoDE art. 1110.
275 Swiss CoDE OF OBLICATiONS art. 25.
2 76Paget v. Marshall, 28 Ch. D. 255 (1885); 2 CHITTY, PLEADING § 237 (1809);
StroLL, EQurry 569 (1878).
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compensation is given."277 The Restatement further provides that "the
value of the promised performance is always one of the chief elements
in fixing the amount that may be recovered as damages. The gains
referred to in the present Section are the prospective gross
receipts "278 When the parties can be placed in their former posi-
tions and when the mistake is clearly established and convincingly
shown, the instrument will be cancelled or rescinded for the mistake
of one of the parties. It has been stated in a Minnesota case that
the weight of authority is to the effect that a court, in the exercise of
its equitable powers, may cancel a contract at the instance of a party
who proves that he was mistaken as to a material element of the con-
tract at the time he made it, if he acts promptly and the contract can
be rescinded without prejudice to the other party; that is, if both
parties can be placed in status quo. This on the ground that the parties
did not have the same subject-matter in mind in making the contract,
and did not in fact come to an agreement in respect to the same
thng.279
The reliance interest doctrine is incorporated in section 3408 of the
California Civil Code. It is worth noting that both Texas,8 0 where
the principle is recognized, and Calffornia 28 show strong traces of the
influence of the civil law. Thus in the common law, rescission is allowed
only in the infrequent cases in which the status quo can be restored
without paying damages for the reliance interest of the defendant,
that is, by restoring the consideration received by the party who was
in error; and therefore any slight change in the position of the de-
fendant bars rescission for any kind of mistake. This qualification to
the right to rescind for unilateral mistake is absent in the law of
France, 2 Germany,2"8 Switzerland,2 4 Italy,88 Austria,28 Argentina, s
2 7 7B.ESTATEMENT, CoNTAcTs § 502(c) (1932).
278 Id. § 329, comment b.
279 Olson v. Shepard, 165 Minn. 433, 436, 206 N.W 711, 712 (1926). See Fehlberg
v. Cosine, 16 R.I. 162, 13 Atl. 110, 111 (1888); Murray v. Sanderson, 62 Wash. 477,
114 Pac. 424 (1911). For a collection of cases see Annot., 59 A.L.R. 809, 824 (1929).
280 See Brown v. Bradley, 259 S.W 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
281 CAL. Civ. CoDe § 3408.
282 Only by junsprudence. Although the Code is silent, damages are recoverable
against the mistaken party. See JossEuAin, Couns DE Daorr civIL PosITI FEANCAIS art.
72(2) (2d ed.). No damage-interest will be awarded, nor rescission allowed, if the mis-
taken party was negligent. Judgment of July 25, 1900, [19021 Recueil GCn6ral de
Lois et des Arr6ts I. 317 (Cass. civ.).
2 S8 GEm&.i CiviL CODE § 122.
2 8 4 SwIss CoDE Or OB uGATiONS arts. 26, 107; 64 ATF II. 9, [19391 J. Trib. 158
(1939).
2 85 ITALLz Civm ConE art. 1223.
2 86 AusTapu Crvm CoDE. art. 878.
287 See MAcHAnO, CoimNTmos 121-22 (1875).
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China,2 88 Louisiana8" and Califorma,9 0 where the reliance interest
doctrine permits relief to the mastaken party m a much wider range
of situations than in the common law
There is no room for doubt that the subjective approach to the
problem of relief from unilateral mistake m contracting enlarges the
scope of excusable errors which entitle the mistaken party, in civil
law, to rescind a contract. There is equally no room for doubt that
the area of difference in result from the objective approach to the
problem of relief in common law is greatly narrowed by the require-
ment of awareness of the possibility of mistake. The tests as to the
extent of suspicion of mistake, either in the subject matter of the
contract or in the motive for contracting which may lead to frustration
of purpose, vary from country to country, but the ultimate effect of
the requirement on enforceability leads, in many cases, to fairly similar
results in the case of unilateral nstake. As in other comparisons be-
tween the results of the operation of different conceptual approaches
to the solution of legal problems in the two master systems, the primary
difference is due to the imperfect reception of the principles of equity
in Anglo-American common law
Third Party Contracts
In classic Roman law a contract could not confer a benefit on a
stranger to the contract. A basic doctrine of contract law was "nemo
alteri stipulari potest." Exceptions began in the time of Justinan. The
Roman stipulatio was to the effect that an enforceable promise for
the benefit of a third person could be created only (1) by exacting a
promise to pay a third person if the promisor did not render some
performance to the person who had exacted the pronse, or (2) by
a transfer of property as a gift subject to the donee's charge to transfer
the property to another.9 1 This narrow limitation of the rights of
strangers to the contract was, until comparatively recent times, a basic
doctrine of the civil law The expansion of the doctrine in civil law
countries in recent years is an example of how the law, in order to
meet new needs of society, bursts the bonds created by codes.2 92 The
2 88 CHRIESE Crvi. CODE art. 91 (Hsia, Chow, Cinch & Chaing transl. 1944).
28 9 LA. Civ. CODE ANN. § 1837 (West 1952) (errors of person). This was extended
by analogy, by jurisprudence in Youngblood v. Daily Tribune, 15 La. App. 379, 131 So.
604 (1930).
290 Goodrich v. Lathrop, 94 Cal. 56, 29 Pac. 329 (1892). CAL. Civ. CODE § 3408.
See McClintock, Mistake and the Contractual Interests, 28 MiNN. L. REv. 460 (1944).
2911 PoTaM, OEuvms No. 70 (1830).
292 On the liberal application of the provisions of the French Civil Code see 6
PLANIOL & REmar, op. cit. supra note 242, No. 353 (1930).
enlargement of the civil law doctrine finds additional support in the
Roman law doctrine of negotiorum gestio.
2 93
Article 1119 of the French Civil Code provides that one can con-
tract only for his own benefit, except where the stipulator has an
interest.294 The situations provided for in Article 1121 and 1165 of
the Civil Code are where the promisee derives a personal benefit from
the performance to be made to the third person, and where the
promisor received property which he agreed to deliver as a gift from
the transferor to. a third person. Article 1121 provides that
When such is the condition of a stipulation that a person makes for
himself, or of a donation that he makes for another, he who has made
such a stipulation can no longer revoke it, if the third party has de-
clared himself willing to profit by it.
A stipulation for another, to have any effect, must be a condition
attached to a stipulation for oneself or a charge imposed on a donation
made to another.2 95 Tune refers to the broad interpretation given to
Article 1121 as an example of "givmg to the law a progressive and
general adaptation to modem conditions of life."2 98 Thus by a process
of interpretation of the two exceptional situations provided for in
Article 1121 and 116 5,2 7 almost every promise or transfer for the
benefit of a third person is directly enforceable by the third person
against the promisor, as in the law of the United States, where the
contract can be enforced directly by the third party beneficiary The
exceptions have been so extended by ]urisprudence as to recognize
the validity of virtually every promise for the benefit of a third person.
The Civil Code enunciates the general principle that a person cannot
exact a promise for a -third party otherwise than as an agent. By way
of exception it provides that a person can stipulate for the benefit of a
third party when this is the condition of a stipulation for his benefit,
or of a donation made for another. By a devious course of interpreta-
tion the exception has been made to eat up the rule, so that third party
rights are now fully protected in French law 299
293 See Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person in the Civil Law,
16 HAiv. L. REv. 43 (1902).
294 Accord, EGYiP~N CrvL CoDE art. 154 (Perrott, Fanner & Sims Marshall 1952).
See also id. art. 155. The stipulation is revocable until the beneficiary notifies the
promisor of his assent.
295 See 1 PoTmHEr, OEuvREs No. 70 (1830).
296 Tunc, The Grand Outlines of the Code Napoleon, 29 TuL. L. ERv. 431, 441
(1955).297 See generally Razi, Reflections on Equity in the Civil Law Systems, 13 Am.
U.L. Rev. 24 (1963).
298 Lawson, The Approach to French Law, 34 IND. L.J. 531, 540 (1959).
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In the common law the rights of third parties have always been recog-
nized in the United States, and since the 1920's, they have also been
recognized in England.
Frustration of Contractual Expectations
It has been said that "the need for some exoneration from the
obligations of a contract is necessary and now widely recognized in
different legal systems."299 An example of the almost umversal appeal
of the principles of equity to the human conscience is the uniformity
of the gradual enlargement in different legal systems of the defense
of inpossibility of performance of contracts to the defense of frustra-
tion of the purpose for which the contract was made. The defense of
impossibility is often allowed even though performance would still
be possible and has come to be called economic impossibility The
doctrine of economic impossibility was introduced in Germany during
the First World War but was confined to general economic changes
which involved the prospect of economic rum. 0 The German doctrine
is based on the general sections of the Civil Code requiring good faith
and conformity to ordinary practice.S°1 As early as 1850, the doctrine
had been suggested by Windscheid in his theory of presuppositions
("Voraussetzung") of the contract.02 In 1921, Windscheid's theory
was revived by Oertmann and re-named the requirement basis
("Geschaftsgrundlage") the assumption, obvious to the other party
to the contract, as to circumstances which formed the basis of the
contractual intent.303 This test is somewhat similar to the American
doctrine of basic assumptions, although it is not subject to all the
imperfections of that doctrine. The weakness of the American doctrine,
as Corbin has pointed out,04 is that the assumption may not be obvious
and yet may warrant relief. In German law, section 306 of the Civil
Code, which provides that impossibility is no defense unless it existed
at the initiation of the contract, has been extended by judicial decision
to include supervening impossibility.3 05
2
99 Wortley, The Need for More Uniformity in the Law Regulating the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods in Europe, m Legal Problems of the European Economic Community
and the European Free Trade Association, -rN. & CoMw. L.Q., No. 1, 45, 53 (1961).
30098 RGZ 18, 21, [1921] J.W 763 (1920).
01 See Hay, Frustration and its Solution in German Law, 10 Am. J. CoMI,. L. 345,
356-73 (1961).
3 0 2 Dm LEmmE Dus RoMscm EECaTS voN DEn VoRAussSEurN (1950).
3 03 See NEwwx, Eqqurv AND LAw. A CoMlABAnmv STumv 195 (1961).
304 6 ComiN, CoNra4crs § 1322 (rev. ed. 1962).
s05 42 RGZ 115 (1899).
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In French law there are two articles of the Civil Code 6 which
provide for relief in cases of legal or physical impossibility There is
no provision in the code for the doctrine of clausula rebus sw stantibus
which is found in Roman law In France the doctrine of economic
frustration is applied to public contracts in the Conseil d'Etat but is
rejected in the case of private contracts in the Cour de Cassation3 °7
In 1916, the Conseil d'Etat extended the defense of impossibility to
situations in which performance had become merely more burdensome
although not impossible. 808 The decision rests on an nnplied intention
of the parties to include the rebus sic stantibus principle, based on
Article 1150 of the Civil Code and on the good faith requirement of
Article 1134.
In Swiss law the doctrine of frustration finds its origin in Article
373 of the Code of Obligations, which permits the judge, where extra-
ordinary circumstances have intervened, to increase the price or to
allow rescission. Support for the frustration doctrine is found in the
broad requirement of good faith in Article 2 of the Civil Code. There
is an express provision in Article 527 of the Code of Obligations for
rescission for excessive hardship due to intervening circumstances,
but the provision is construed to provide only for rescission of agree-
ments for lifelong support. Various theories have been advanced as
to the ground for granting relief. Examples of the exercise of the
power of rescission under Article 373 are war, natural cataclysm, local
troubles, or the burning of a factory3 9
In India and Pakistan the doctrine of frustration is applied in the
face of a statute which refers only to impossibility81 In Spain the
doctrine of frustration is narrowly applied.11 The doctrine is recog-
nized in Soviet law only in cases in which the interests of the State
are involved. The doctrine is not a part of Islamic law
In the Italian Civil Code there are two provisions dealing with
the effect of supervening events which increase the burden of per-
formance. Article 1463 provides that in synallagmatic contracts a
party released by supervening inpossibility cannot require perfor-
mance by the other party Article 1467 deals specifically with frustra-
306 Fpxrc Cwm CODE arts. 1147, 1148.
307 Judgment of Nov. 15, 1933, 134 Recueil de la Gazette des Tribuneaux 1. 17
(Cass. civ.).
08Judgment of May 30, 1916, [19161 Recueil P6nodique et Critique III. 25
(Conseil d'Etat).
30948 ATF II. 366 (1922).
310 INuN CoNimAc'rs ACT § 56(2).
311 PiNG PANA, TRATADO E DmmcHo CrvIL ESPAGNOL 49, 58 (1946).
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tion due to other circumstances than impossibility and provides that
in contracts for continuous performance, for performance in mstall-
ments, or for deferred performance discharge or adjustment may be
granted if performance becomes "excessively onerous" by reason of
"extraordinary or unforeseeable events," unless the event or situation
was "a normal risk of the contract." 12 In Article 1467 the Italian
legislators reinstated the Roman doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, a
particularly striking innovation in Italian law since the Civil Code of
1865 had treated conditions with extreme technicality and made no
allowance for mutually interdependent conditions. The Italian Civil
Code of 1942 bases the doctrine of frustration on the theory of rebus
sic stantibus.013 Excessive hardship due to war, if unforeseen, excuses
performance.314 Destruction of material also excuses performance.31 5
Hungarian law applies the doctrine of frustration, without authority
in the unenacted code of 1928, in cases of depreciation. a Rescission
for economic impossibility is allowed only if the other party would
have received a disproportionately large profit. In Brazil, the Court
of Appeal of Rio de Janeiro, in 1933, rescinded a contract on the theory
of impr6vslon. 17 After the Second World War, rescission was allowed
to prevent the ruinous effect of inflation, as was also the case in Chile
and m The Argentine.318 The 1941 project for the revision of the
Brasilian Civil Code, not yet completed, includes in Article 322 a
provision for relief in cases of frustration. Extreme difficulty and
excessive injury would permit modification of the contract.
The earliest example of the doctrine of frustration in England is
the case of British Movetonews, Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas,
Ltd.3"9 The House of Lords reversed the decision, but in 1956 the
doctrine was again applied in Davs Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham
i.D.C., n a decision by Lord Radcliffe.320 The standard of funda-
mental changes in circumstances is very strictly defined.
In cases at common law in the United States the doctrine is also
3 12 COLAGPiESSO, IL Lm, DE..A OBBLIGAZIONF--CoMXNTE AL NUOVE ComCE
Cn, Ln ITAL ANE 492 (1943).
313 1 BEr, TEomA GENEnA DELE A OBBLIGAZIONI 188 (1953).
14 N w AN, op. cit. supra note 303, at 234.
315 Id. at 230.
81 6 HUNGABAN Cvm CODE OF 1928 (unenacted) art. 1150; Case No. 2990 M.D.
(1927).
3 1 7 See NE WAN, op. cit. supra note 303, at 201 n.50.
818 See CAmNs, iMPEmiN (1937).
319 [19501 2 All E.R. 390 (Dennmg, L.J.), re'd, [1951] 2 All E.R. 617. See gen-
erally Cow, Some Observations on Frustration, 3 INT. & ComT. L.Q. 291, 320 (1954).
320 [1956] 2 All E.R. 145, 156 (Radcliffe, L.J.). See Soci6t6 Franco Tunisienne
D'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A., [1960] 2 All E.R. 529.
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applied, but only sparingly 3 2' It is generally denied in actions for
damages, but in equity the doctrine is applied, 322 although to a much
less extent than on the European continent. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code a party who is excused may nevertheless be required
to make substituted performance.323 Under the English Frustrated
Contracts Act an apportionment of benefits is permitted. 24 The
obligor may be required to restore all or part of any sums advanced
by the obligee, resembling the doctrine of equitable readjustment in
civil law
It is plain that the German doctrine of "Wegfall der Geschafts-
grundlage," the French doctrine of "impr6vision," and the Anglo-
American doctrine of failure of basic presuppositions are so similar
as to suggest strong mutual influence.325 A California case uses the
term unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contempla-
tion of the parties.326 The underlying rationale in all legal systems is
relief from hardship, requiring a sharing of the burden between the
parties to the contract. The same results are reached in the doctrine
of supervening hardslp of Swedish law32 and the doctrine of excessive
onerosity of Italian328 and Polish329 law The German doctrine rests
on the general provisions of the Civil Code requiring good faith and
conformity to ordinary practice.3 30 The doctrine of clausula rebus sw
stantibus is the expression of the same equitable principle in inter-
national law 331
In rights and obligations arising out of voluntarily assumed rela-
tions, the areas of convergence are in the standards to be applied in
contractual negotiations and in the situations which require release
of one of the parties from the obligations of the contract if the burdens
of loss when things go wrong are to be shared. It is clear that the con-
vergences lie mainly in the areas in which equitable considerations
form an important element of the governing legal norms.
321 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944), 43 Mich. L.
Rev. 985. See generally Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3
DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (1953); Comment, 59 Mici. L. REv. 98 (1961).
322 See Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 557 (1869); 5 WiL.ToN, Co'nuAcrs
§ 1425 (rev. ed. 1937).
3 2 3 UNWOni CoMvMMcIAL. CoDE § 2-614, comment 1.
324 The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40.
325 Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in
International Trade, 63 CoLumn. L. REv. 1413, 1414 & n.3 (1963).
326 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 53, 153 P.2d 47, 49-50 (1944) (dictum).
82 7 SW ISH SALES ACT § 24 (1905).
328 Ira.AN Cvn. CoDE art. 1467.
829 POLISH CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 269.
83 0 GmonM~ nl CoDE §§ 157, 242.
$8
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Rights and Obligations Arising out of
Non-contractual Relations
Rights and Obligations Created by Law
to Prevent Unjust Enrichment
In Roman law the doctrine of unjust enrichment was expressed in
the principle of negotiorum gestio, according to which the gestor might
claim reimbursement for his services in managing the affairs of a
person who was absent or incapacitated, without his knowledge, even
though the services did not ultimately prove beneficial. The doctrine
of unjust enrichment also found expression in the actio de -n rem
verso, by which recovery could be obtained against a parent or em-
ployer for unauthorized acts of a son or agentY32 These doctrines
implemented the principle that no one should be enriched through
another's loss. Of less importance was the conditio indebiti, under
which payment by mistake entitled the payer to a refund.
Benefits Received by Mistake or Without Request
In civil law the doctrine of unjust enrichment is based directly
on the equitable duty to reimburse protective action taken in good
faith, the relief stemming from the doctrine of negotiorum gestio and
the actio de in rem verso. There is no general expression of the latter
doctrine in the French Civil Code, which recognizes the principle of
unjust enrichment in only four specific situations: payment by mis-
take,338 payments not due,334 property received without considera-
tion,33 5 and the obligation to restore specific property in kind.33
6
Nevertheless, in 1892, the Cour de Cassation laid down the broad rule
that no one may enrich himself unduly at another's expense,37 the
basis of the actio de in rem verso of Roman law "s The Italian Civil
Code provides that "A person who, without justifiable cause, has en-
riched himself at the expense of another must, within the limits of
his enrichment, indemnify the latter in an amount corresponding" to
the loss of property suffered by such person.339 In German law
recovery is limited to situations in which the enrichment was direct.3 40
882 ULPiAx, DIGEsT 3.5.10, 12.6.14, 12.3.8.
8
3 FwqNcH Cw. CODE art. 1377.
83 4 FnENcH CWn CODE art. 1235.
3 3 F Fca Crvm CODE art. 1376.
8
33 FnENCH CwL CODE art. 1379.
33 Judgment of June 15, 1892, [1892] Recueil FNnodique et Critique I. 596, 93
Recueil G6n6ral de Lois et des ArrAts I. 281 (Cass. req.).
8
3 8 DiGEST 2.6.14. The doctrine is based on pure equity. LAoumiOim, OBLICATONS
sous .'AnTicr 1375.
3 39 ITALTAN Cwm CODE art. 2041.
340See DAwsoN, UNJusT ENa.mc r 120 (1951); GEmAN CL CODE § 812.
In Soviet law damages for unjust enrichment due to mistaken perfor-
mance of an invalid contract are forfeited to the State 41 In the United
States there can be no recovery by a volunteer,3 42 a mistaken im-
prover, 43 or generally one who pays in error of law"4 There is no
recovery in quasi contract for the use and occupation of land without
the consent of the owner, nor, in general, for income derived from a
letting of another person's land, for historical reasons; mdebitatus
assumpsit is confined to genuine tenancies.34 5 Knowingly receiving
benefits from another's services creates a duty to reimburse the person
who rendered the services 4' It is obvious that the comparatively few
areas of imperfect acceptance in common law of the doctrine of unjust
enrichment and the limited circumstances in which the doctrine is
rejected in German law are not sufficiently important to prevent, in
the near future, a complete acceptance of the equitable doctrine of
unjust enrichment.
Encroachers
No recovery is allowed at common law if the occupier sues for
the value of his improvements. 4 7 In equity, if specific relief is sought
against the encroacher, relief will be denied unless the landowner
compensates the occupier for the value of his improvements if the
improvements were made in good faith. 4 In French law the occupier
in good faith may remove his work unless the landowner pays him
for' its value. 49 In Switzerland the occupier in good faith may even
acquire the land for adequate compensation unless the landowner
made timely objection to the encroachment. 50 In Italian law the
building becomes the property of the occupier for the value, or the
cost, or damages. In all these legal systems the principle of the obliga-
tion to relinquish the benefits of unjustified enrichment underlies the
variations of the application of the principles of law which recognize,
in different ways, rights which inhere in the mistaken occupancy of
another person's land.
3 4 1 
SOVE CiWv CODE art. 147.
3 42 RBsrAAT~mmN, PRoPERTY § 2, comment (1936).
848 Isle Royale Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332 (1887); Brand v. Chris Building
Co. P't'y, Ltd., [1957] Viet. 625.
344 Corbm, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YAix L.. 533, 543 (1912).
345 Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53 (1888).
846 Ball v. Dolan, 21 S.D. 619, 114 N.W 998 (1908).
347 Cases cited note 343 supra.
348 Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N.H. 572, 15 At. 17 (1888).
349 Conxn & CAPrrANT, Cours r mENTAi DE niorr crvii RAxc Ais No. 1066
(loth Sd. 1942).
850 Swiss Cwr CoDE art. 674.
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Imperfect Performance
In Anglo-American equity, failure to perform a contract exactly
as agreed will not preclude enforcement by the party in default, when
there is appropriate compensation to the other party as' Delay m per-
formance entitles the promisee only to damages for the delay but does
not entitle him to refuse the delayed performance. This is also the
law in Germany, 52 France,3 a Switzerland,354 Ital3 55 and Austria. 56 In
German law a promisor in default by reason of delay in performance
must be given a reasonable time, after notice, in which to perform."5 "
Until then, no damages can be recovered by the party who is entitled
to receive the performance. In France the requirement of reasonable
notice, the mise en demeure, or placing in defaul, is optional with the
injured party and is not a condition to his right to redress. 5 In China
the equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture was law by the time
of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A.D ), a thousand years ago. 59 Only
in the inner system of Anglo-American common law is the right of
a person who is in default to obtain compensation from the adversary
party demed; 60 but the equitable doctrine is making constant inroads
in actions for damages, as the doctrine of substantial performance
gains increasing acceptance in the English speaking parts of the
world. 16 Except for comparatively rare exceptions in Anglo-American
common law, the general acceptance of the substantial performance
doctrine is due to the phenomenon, rarely encountered in Anglo-
American common law, that the equitable standards of honesty have
been completely accepted in the Anglo-American law of unjust
enrichment.
351 See 3 CoaaBi, ComNTcra s § 704 (1950).
352 Judgement of Dec. 18, 1925, 55 J.W 985 (Reichsgencht).
Bus 2 RirEwT & BOU.AGER, TRr EL-AEMANAiRE DE DRorr CIVL DE PLANIOL No.
1259 (2d ed. 1947).
354 Swiss CODE: o OBLIATIONS art. 107.
35 5 ITALIAN CivIL CODE art. 1432 provides that a party who has acted under mistake
cannot demand the annulment of the contract if prior to the time when such party might
have been prejudiced by the mistake, the other party offers to perform in a manner
conforming to the intent of the mistaken party. See also Vanzo v. Barbara, xxv Giuns-
prudenza Completa della Corte Suprema di Cassazione II. 756 (1950).
3 56 AusTRT.i CiviL CODE § 919.
S5 7 GEMAN Civ CODE § 286.
3 5 8 Far.cH Ci-r. CODE: arts. 1153, 1176.
859 Miscellaneous Rules, LAws AND Ruxxs ON PENAL MATTERS or TBE SuNG.
DYNA.sTy vol. 26.
$60 Saperstem v. Mechanics & Farmers Say. Bank, 228 N.Y. 257, 126 N.E. 708
(1920).
861 RESTATEmENT, CoNraAacrs § 375; WLIToN, CoNTir=s § 494 (rev. ed. 1936).
Note, 31 COLUm. L. REv. 307 (1931). See Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1297 (1930).
Liability for Negligence
In primitive societies the wielder of an instrument was identified
with injuries inflicted by it. The direct causality determined respon-
sibility, that is, the obligation to answer for the injurys62 Very early,
however, the doctrine evolved that responsibility existed, apart from
consensual arrangements, only for fault. In Roman law, torts, unlike
nominate contracts, were not classified. This may explain the generality
of the provisions of the French Civil Code, which makes a person
liable for harm which he has caused, enabling the entire law of delic-
tual responsibility to be stated in five terse articles. The problem of
legal responsibility is approached generally rather than, as in common
law, from the starting point of closely defined individual torts. The
Roman law doctrine of liability only for fault has since very early
times been a part of western law
In French law the general basis of tort liability is negligence or
the intentional infliction of harm, 63 although tls concept is not ex-
pressly stated in the Civil Code. The part of the Code which deals
with delictual responsibility starts with the provision in Article 1382
that everyone is obliged to repair injury which he has caused. The
next article, 1383, provides that one is liable not only for injuries caused
by his conduct but also for those caused by his negligence. It is ob-
vious that Article 1382 requires fault to establish liability, otherwise
the reference in Article 1383 to negligence would be superfluous. This
article defines fault in terms of negligence. The following article, 1384,
provides that a guardian or person having control of an inanimate
object is responsible for damage by fire caused by the object, and
Article 1385 provides for liability for damage caused by an animal
owned by the defendant. These two articles are clearly exceptions to
the general rule of liability only for fault. The final article dealing
with tortious liability, Article 1386, which provides for liability for
damage caused by the destruction of a building not kept in good condi-
tion, rests also on strict liability 86 4 There must be causation between
862 COD. OF HANmuntr~i law 233 (cir. 1960 B.C.).
863 2 PuFFENDoRT, ELEMENTORUM JUmSpRUDENTLA UrvnsAisrs 263 (Oldfather
transl. 1964) refers to the principle 'let man make good the damage he has done to a
second person by his fault."
364 2 PLANIOL, TnATJ PAITiQuE Du DROIT CIvIm FRANCA.S pt. 1, Nos. 924, 928
(11th ed. 1939); see JossERAND, DE LA RisPoNsaxmrrf Du FAF iEs CHOSEs InANMfZEs
(1897); PLANoL, RsPoNsAwirrA Du FArr DES cHosEs, E~vUE cRmQUE 80 (1906). In
jurisprudence, a presumption of fault exsts against the owner of the thing, Judgment
of June 16, 1896, [1897] Recueil P6nodique et Critique I. 433, [1897] Recueil Gn6ral
de Lois et des Arr6ts I. 17 (Cass. civ. 2e), prior to the law of 9 April 1898, which
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the fault, required under Article 1382, and the in]ury, to make the
actor responsible.
Strict Liability
In modem times the recognition of liability without fault, or strict
liability, has been widely received in both civil and common law The
doctrine of strict liability, apart from the specific situations mentioned
in the Code, was introduced into French law in 1896 on the basis of
a presumption of negligence. Much the same development had already
taken place in Anglo-American law, commencing n 1863, on the basis
of the doctrine of res spsa loquitur and in the exceptional case of the
obligation to provide support of adjoining'land, i.e. the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher 65 In both legal systems, strict liability is con-
sidered an exception to the general rule of liability based on fault. In
French law the extension has been just as real as in Anglo-American
law, although less explicitly stated. The Court of Cassation still prefers
to rest the doctrine, however, on the specific exceptions in the Civil
Code."8
In German law the doctrine of strict liability was provided for in
the Civil Code of 1900. Section 823 provides that "one, who designedly
or negligently injures life, body, health, freedom, the property or any
right of another is bound to indemnify the other for the injury arising
therefrom." This section expressly rests liability on intent to injure, or
on negligence. Section 833 provides that "if a human being is killed,
or injured or a thing is damaged by an animal, its keeper is bound
to indemnify the party injured for the damage resulting therefrom."
This provision, resting on strict liability, is obviously an exception to
the general rule. Section 836 provides that
if, by the fall of a building a human being is killed or
injured, or a thing damaged, the possessor of the lot of land, in so far
as the fall or the severing is the consequence of faulty arrangement or
insufficient maintenance, is bound to indemnify the person injured for
the damage. The obligation does not occur if the owner for the pur-
pose of averting the danger has observed the care required in trade.
This bases the liability on negligence, contrary to the corresponding
provision of the French Civil Code. The modem doctrine of strict
eliminated the importance of the distinction in the case of industrial accidents. See also
Caudemet, 1927 RvmE TmmmrmL 893.
865 [18681 L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
366L'Affaire Giry, [1955] Juns-Classeur P6nodique No. 8691 (Pans Ire Ch. Feb.
2, 1955) et [1956] Juns-Classeur Pnodique No. 9681 (Cass. 2d Ch. civ. Nov. 23, 1956)
(Note by Esmem).
liability is recogmzed in German law under the name of Gefahrdung-
shaftung, hazardous activities. The principal kinds of accidents within
the meaning of section 823 are railway, industrial and motor vehicle
accidents.
Both civil law and common law, after a very early period of strict
law, developed the doctrine of liability only for fault. Under the
pressure of new social needs arising from industrial advance, this
doctrine has been modified so as to embrace a wide variety of situa-
tions in which strict liability becomes actionable. Examples are the
workmen's compensation legislation, the obligation of landowners to
support the land adjoining their property, and the liability of operators
of aircraft for damage to the property over which the aircraft flies. 67
Strict liability in modem law is far different from the test of causation
in primitive times. It rests, in many situations, on the attribution of
responsibility to the person or firm in the chain of causation by which
the burden of risk can be shifted most effectively to the segment of
the community which is actually or potentially concerned with pro-
tection from similar injures in the future. The enlargement has been
somewhat greater in common law than in civil law, but the same
trend is clearly discernible in both systems. In recent times the com-
mon law doctrine has been expanded in some jurisdictions to include
responsibility of a manufacturer for harm caused by the use of his
product even after it has been re-sold to another. 68 In a recent decision
of a California court, the doctrine was extended to a wholesaler, who
was neither a manufacturer nor a retailer, for failure to give notice
to the purchaser of a fuse for detonating powder that the fuse burned
more quickly than other fuses already M use. 69 Both systems have
abandoned the early approach which imposed liability almost exclu-
sively for fault.
Scandinavian and Swiss law have recognized situations in which
a person may be liable without any fault of his own. Toward the end
of the nineteenth century, Scandinavian law by judicial decision,370
usually in the case of ultra-hazardous activities, as in German, French
and American law, inposed strict liability for the risks of modern life.
The concept of strict liability in the modern sense has been accepted
in the law of western societies without regard to conventional concepts
of tort liability
867 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
368 See Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devtces,
24 CoL-M. L. REv. 335, 358 (1924).
369 Canffax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
370 USSMg, Scandinavian Law of Torts, 1 Am. J. Comm. L. 359, 361 (1952).
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Enforcement of Rights and Obligations
Specific Enforcement
It is commonly thought that the doctrine of specific enforcement
of obligations, for example by decrees directing the specific perfor-
mance of contracts, is peculiar to the common law This view is incor-
rect except m the particular application of specific enforcement to
personal mandates of the court enforced by imprisonment for con-
tempt. In Roman law the tendency was to confine enforcement to
pecuniary compensation. This limitation stemmed from the concept
of absolute ownership; no qualification of this concept could be
suffered as the result of contract. The res itself could not be subjected
by the creditor of the owner to alteration of the right to its absolute
ownership for the satisfaction of obligations due to the creditor. Either
the alienation of ownership must take place concurrently with the
execution of the contract of sale or the contract left the ownership
intact. In modem times an additional basis of the limitation of enforce-
ment to pecuniary compensation is to be found in the ideological bases
of the French Revolution. 71 The feeling that men should not be denied
their personal liberty by imprisonment for civil wrongdoing has led
to the virtually uniform rejection, throughout the civil law countries,
of imprisonment for contempt, and as a result, the most effective
means for commanding the performance of duties requring personal
action by the obligor has been abandoned. Pothier said that only
damages were available in obligations to do or not to do, and this
precept was carried into the French Civil Code in Article 1142, which
declares that the breach of obligations to do or not to do results only
in damages. However, the next article, 1143, provides that the creditor
can demand that that which was done in violation of the agreement be
destroyed and can have himself authorized to destroy it at the debtor's
expense. Article 1144 provides 'that the creditor can also, in case of
nonperformance, be authorized to perform at the expense of the debtor.
Taken together, the courts have construed the three articles to mean
that the provisions for specific execution are the general rule, and only
where specific execution is impossible or impracticable will the creditor
be left to his remedy in damages. Building on the provisions of Articles
1143 and 1144, the courts have reconciled the conflict between 1142
and the two following articles by a somewhat forced construction of
Article 1142. That article has been construed to express the ordinary
result in such obligations, according to which the creditor is reimbursed
3 7 1 PoTIER, Trait de contrat de vente, OEuvIxs No. 68 (1824).
for ns outlay in damages, in connection with decrees for specific execu-
tion, and the debtor is not required personally to perform.372 There
are numerous decisions which illustrate the primacy in French law
of specific relief for breach of all sorts of voluntary obligations. In
case of obligations to give, forced execution is the ordinary method of
enforcement, but in the case of obligations to do or not to do, forced
execution is somewhat exceptional. In German law the plaintiff is
precluded from obtaining a judgment for damages unless he has first
given the defendant an opportunity to perform the contract.
The English chancellor found a model for enforcement of obliga-
tions in the canon law The canoical doctrine that the remedy of
denunciatio evangelica was not necessary if an ordinary action at law
was available accurately mirrors the doctrine of equity that equity
will act only in the absence of an adequate remedy in damages. In
the canoical institution of imploratio officii sudices, providing for re-
lief in cases of extreme hardship,73 is to be found the prototype of
the doctrine of equity that equity will act only to prevent irreparable
injury As in canon law the decisive question was whether the defen-
dant could have acted as he did in good conscience, and relief in the
court of the chancellor was granted according to criteria which were
not confined by rules of strict logic or by analogy to prior decisions.
In canon law good conscience required personal activity and accurate
fulfillment of promises by actual performance. 7 4 The doctrine of
denunczatio evangelica of twelfth century canon law provided for
worldly redress as well as penitence; a perfect model for the doctrine
of equity that equity acts in personam. In equity the emphasis is on
the defendant's duty 3
7 5
The two streams of juristic thought represented in the civil law
and common law doctrines have produced differences in methods of
3 72 Articles 1143 and 1144 of the French Civil Code authorize the creditor (plaintiff)
to perform the debtor's obligation at the debtor's expense. Direct execution is available
to obtain the possession of land. 7 PL.ANIOL & PBir-air, TnArrA P.ATiQuE Du iDorr crvm
FnANc.as No. 779 (2d ed. 1954). In German law the buyer can have specific enforce-
ment if the asset can be reached by physical seizure. Z1VMLPROZESSO3DNNG [ZPO]
§§ 833, 886. Title to land can pass by force of the judgment ZPO §§ 894, 896.
373 The canonical institution of imploratio officii iudices was in common use when
the English Chancery began to function as a court, in the middle of the fourteenth
century.
874 Fry, Specific Performance and Laesw Fidez, 5 L.Q. ,Ev. 235 (1889); Case
No. 1893, BRAcTON'S NOrTFooi (1227) (Maitland ed.); Decretal, Greg. IX 1.35.3
("studioso agendum est ut ea quae promittuntur opere compleantur"); 2 Por.Loc &
MA=r.mLm, THE HisToRy oF ENGrasH LAw 189 (3d ed. 1923); Coing, English Equity
and the Denunctatio Evangilica of the Canon Law,'71 L.Q. REv. 223 (1955).
875Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Haav. L. Rlv. 97, 106 (1908).
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enforcement in the two master systems. However, the difference
proves, on closer examination, to be less unbridgeable than is com-
monly supposed. In French and German law obligations are enforced
specifically in many more cases than in common law, by methods other
than imprisonment for contempt. A common method of specific en-
forcement is through a judicial mandate empowering the plaintiff, or
an officer of the court, to perform the necessary operations at the
expense of the defendant. This method is used in all cases in which
the obligation can be carried out without the personal action of the
obligor, and where merely ministerial acts are required, as in the
case of the execution and delivery of a deed by the effect of the decree
itself. In French law, obligations to give are enforced by specific
execution, since such obligations are of a nature which permits such
enforcement without the personal action of the promisor.3 76 A specific
description of the property is of course necessary As between the
parties, an agreement to sell personal property is, in some civil law
systems, equivalent to an actual transfer of title. 7 This doctrine finds
a counterpart, so far as the transfer of equitable ownership is con-
cerned, in the common law doctrine of equitable conversion in
contracts for the sale of land.
In 1889, the doctrine of astretnte was introduced into French juris-
prudence.378 The doctrine is a direct inheritance from Roman law 379
As an inducement to specific performance by the defendant, the court
will fix a penalty, increasing daily as long as the delay lasts. As a rule,
the damages fixed are greatly in excess of the pecuniary prejudice to
the plaintiff caused by the debtor's default. Although there is nothing
in French procedure resembling the Anglo-American mn]unction, the
sanction of moratory damages is used to enforce obligations not to
do as well as obligations to do. The doctrine of astreinte finds no
authority in the French Civil Code. It is the impression of many French
jurists that the astreinte, although purely an %n terrorem judicial
stratagem with no sanction other than its mtiidating effect, is ex-
tremely successful in inducing personal performance by the defen-
dant. 80 Thus in French law obligations to give are enforced by natural
376 FRENCH CivIL CODE art. 1144; Houmer v. Sommier, [1889] Recueil P6nodique
et Critique I. 445 (Cass. req. March 14, 1889).
8 77 FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1138. See Ames, Specific Performance in French Law,
17 L.Q. REv. 372 (1901).
378 Judgment of March 20, 1889, [1889] Recueil P6nodique et Critique 1. 382,
[1892] Recueil G~n6ral de lois et Arrgts 1. 565 (Cass. civ.).
8 7 9 ULPNiA, DiGEST 12.3.1.
8 8 0 "'Astremte comminatoire n'est tout de mnme pas d6pourvue d'utilit6, car la
cramte subsiste de voir le tribunal 6valuer tris largement le pr6judice pour rapprocher
execution without the intervention of the debtor, and obligations to
do or not to do may be enforced by the plaintiff at the expense of the
debtor. These remedies failing, the threat of the effect of moratory
damages is successful in many cases in iducing personal performance
by the defendant, even though the threat can never be given legal
effect unless the damages are reduced to a proper compensatory
amount. Also, penal clauses are enforced in French law; another sanc-
tion which is not available in common law
The French doctrine of reparation en natur, giving the plaintiff the
right to perform the obligation at the debtor's expense, has its counter-
part in the German doctrine of naturalhersetllung, unless the cost is
disproportionate, 81 and in Swiss law 112 In German law, imprisonment
for contempt is allowed in special circumstances, 3 but elsewhere on
the continent it is not employed.38 4 In Scots law specific restitution,
called specific implement, is the ordinary remedy 3 85 When one calls
to mind the many situations in which the common law denies specific
enforcement-indefinite contracts,8 6 contracts requiring construction
work,387 situations in which the balance of convemence inclines in
favor of the defendant, 88 continuous performance,38 9 personal ser-
vices,390 situations in which the public interest requires that the obliga-
tion of the defendant be not carried out specifically,39 1 and especially
the very large number of cases in which the presence of an adequate
le plus possible le chiffre des dommages-interets du montant de l'astremte prononc6e."
(The threat of the astreite is nevertheless not without utility, for the fear remains of
seeing the court evaluate generously the damage in order to bring the calculation of the
damages as closely as possible to the sum of the astreinte.) MAzEAuD, MAZEAuD &
MAzFAuD, LECONS DE Dnorr civm No. 338 (3d ed. 1963).
38 1 GERMAN CODE OF CivL PuocFDunE §§ 887(1), 257(2).
3 82 SWISS CoDE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 98.
3888 RGZ 336 (1882); ZPO § 899; see Jann, Contempt of Court in Western
Germany, 8 Am. U.L. REv. 34 (1959).
3 8 4 NEw'mAN, EQuITy AND LAW- A ComEArTrwE Sutmy 71-72 (1961).
385 Stewart v. Kennedy, [1890] 15 A.C. 75 (Scot.); T. B. SMrrH, Scotland, 1 TiE
BBarrxs CoMMONWEALTH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CoNsTrrUONs Pt. 2,
1050 (Keeton ed. 1955).
386 See Shayeb v. Holland, 321 Mass. 429, 73 N.E.2d 731 (1947); Simpson, Equity,
1947 ANN. SunvEY Am. L. 803, 812.
8 8 7 See Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y. 366 (1874).
388 Curran v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 116 Mass. 90 (1874); RESTATEMENT,
CoNTRACTS § 367 (1932); Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLum. L. REv. 20
(1905); McClintok, Discretion to Deny Injunctions against Trespass and Nuisance,
12 MIN. L. REv. 565, 568 (1928).
889 Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 339, 358 (1870); PomEnoY, SPER c
PEwORMANCE OF CoNTRnAcrs § 23 (3d ed. 1926).
89ODe Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige 264 (N.Y. 1833).
a91 Rockhill Tennis Club v. Volker, 331 Mo. 947, 56 S.W.2d 9 (1932).
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remedy in the form of damages is held to bar specific enforcement 92--
the methods of enforcement in the two master systems approach each
other much more closely than appears from a comparison of the con-
ceptual formulations of the remedies available in the civil and common
law systems.
Equitable Revision
There exists in civil law a doctrine of reformation of contracts by
the court which is entirely different from the meaning of the term
in Anglo-American law The doctrine was first introduced in Switzer-
land"' and permits a court not merely to grant rescission of a contract
which has become unduly oppressive by reason of newly arisen and
unforeseeable circumstances but to revise the terms of a contract to
conform with what is fair under the circumstances which have arisen.
The German courts, relying on section 242 of the German Civil Code,
which requires performance in good faith, shape the contract in ac-
cordance with changes in circumstances. The economic upheaval must
be fundamental.3 94 If appropriate, the court will increase the payments
rather than permit rescission. 95 Where a lease of business property
required the landlord to fuirmsh steam for industrial purposes and
the price of steam greatly increased due to the war, the court allowed
additional rent in a suit by the landlord for that relief.396 In Italian
law, Article 1450 of the Italian Civil Code expressly empowers the
judge to grant or deny rescission depending on whether the debtor
will offer, and the creditor will accept, an equitable readjustment
of the consideration. This is the approach in German law, where the
court will rescind the contract unless there is an agreement by the
defendant to adjust the terms. gT The Swiss courts go further in author-
izing a positive revision by the court rather than the indirect pressure
of offering the defendant the privilege of escaping the effect of rescis-
sion by agreeing to an equitable readjustment.3 9 Relief will be given
in Switzerland if the circumstances would produce economic ruin
392 Kent, C., m Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 331 (1823); see Union Pac. Ry.
v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U.S. 564 (1896). See UNwOaM CovmacrAL CoDE
§ 2-716; UNWoBm SALES ACr § 68.
3 93 
SWISS CODE oF OBLIGATIONS art. 373.
89107 RGZ 124 (1924) (inflation).
395 107 RGZ 78 (1924).
896 100 RGZ 129 (1920).
397 See The Decree on Judicial Assistance in Respect of Contracts, Nov. 30, 1939,
[19391 1 REcHsGEsE=zBLATr I. 2329.
89859 ATF 11. 372 (1933).
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unless the contract is revised or rescinded.-9 9 Article 269 of the Polish
Code of Obligations of 1933 provides that where, by reason of war
or natural catastrophe, performance becomes mipossible and the bene-
fit of the contract is lost, the court may revise, extend or discharge
the contract. Article 42 provides that a party who has been exploited
can sue to scale down his own performance or to augment the other
party's performance, with the privilege of rescission if these solutions
are difficult to accomplish. Articles 32 and 123 of the Soviet Civil Code
provide that m cases of difficulty of performance the court may post-
pone performance or order performance in installments. There are
provisions m Spanish,400 Greek" 1 and Chinese402 law for modification
of contracts as a result of changes in circumstances. It is apparent that
the doctrine of equitable revision is closely related to the doctrine of
relief from frustration, providing remedies short of complete rescission.
In Swedish law the court may set aside or modify contracts when they
are in conflict with acceptable business practice or would otherwise
be improper.0 3
In Anglo-American equity the consent of the party who seeks to
enforce the contract, to an equitable readjustment of its terms, has
been made a condition to the denial of rescisson. 40 4 The Uniform
Commercial Code provides for revision of unconscionable contracts
of sale. 405 In the enforcement of obligations both civil law and common
law apply the equitable principle which requires humane enforcement
of obligations.
Conclusion
The basic institutions of law exhibit closer similarity than is com-
monly thought to exist. Often the similarity of doctrine is buried under
the mountain of rules in which the fundamental doctrines have been
applied to the circumstances of particular cases. The history of legal
institutions reveals a continuing convergence, in different legal sys-
899 Ibid.
400 For a discussion of SPANISH Civir. CODE art. 1091 see PiNG PENA, TRATA o DE
DEEcrIo CivIL ESPAGNOL 49, 58 (1946). See also 2 PunG BRUTAu, FuNDA ENWOs DE
DERECHO Crvr. 383 n.21 (1954).
401 GREEK Civir CODE art. 388; see Zepos, Frustration of Contract in Comparative
Law and in the New Greek Civil Code of 1946, 11 MoDERN L. REv. 36 (1948).
402 Judicial Yuan Advisory Opinion No. Chia 3439 (1947).
403 Sw DISH PuRcHA E LAW OF 1905, art. 42.
404 Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 557 (1869); Watters v. Ryan, 31 S.D.
536, 141 N.W 359 (1913); Fontaine v. Brown County Motors Co., 251 Wis. 433, 29
N.W.2d 744 (1947).
405 UNnWORM COMMRCIAL CODE § 2-302.
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tems, of doctrines which were initially different from each other. Tins
should occasion no surprise, owing to the origin of all law in human
experience and human emotions.406 A Scottish jurist, who is in an
advantageous position to observe the operation of both the great legal
systems of the western world, believes that American law has by com-
parative methods inproved on the English common law in many ways
and has moved closer to civilian solutions. °7 The main differences in
fundamental doctrines prove to be due to imperfect reception, in all
legal systems, in varying degrees, of the principles of equity which
establish standards of good faith, honesty and compassion. The
nperfect reception in law of the moral standards which are com-
monplace in other institutions of social control-ethics, morals and
religion-is due to the unending clash between the legal objective of
certainty and the equitable objective of individual justice; a conflict
which has troubled legal philosophers since the age of Aristotle. The
deepest part of the cleft between the civil law and the common law
is in the inner system of Anglo-American common law, in which, by
reasons of circumstances of early English history, the reception of
equity slowed in the fourteenth century almost to a halt,40 8 and has
not yet regained its full vigor throughout that legal system.
Complete uniformity between legal systems is neither possible
nor desirable. The growth of the law, like the growth of other social
institutions, is stimulated by the competition of views emanating from
experience in its use. Ends are more inportant than methods for their
attainment. What we are looking for is much more important than
the particular techniques for obtaining our ends. Variations in the
application of fundamental principles are not such as to preclude com-
munication among nations in the field of law 409 Equity may be de-
406 "Law is born naturally in the human spirit." DEL VEcc o, HUMANrril ET UNrIPn
DE Dnorr-EssAms D E PHmosoPHE JuBIIQuE 93 (1963) (concerning the asserted
political character of law). "I1 paroit bien 6trange que les LoLx Civiles n'6tant
presque toutes que des r6gles de l'&quit6, dont la connoisance nous est naturelle, l'dtude
qui devroit en 8tre facile et agreable, soit se difficile et si 6pineuse." (It seems very
strange that the civil laws, winch are nearly all simply the rules of equity, the knowledge
of which is natural to us, and the study of which should be easy and pleasant, should
be so difficult and thorny.) Domat, Preface to Lorx CrmLEs DANS LEtI= ORaE NATUnEL
(1777).
40 7 T. B. Smrr'm THE PRESERVATION or T=E CmirAN TRAnMoN IN CVIn LA W
3x TH MODERN WORLD 7 (Yiannopoulis 1965).
408 The carcumstances under which the English Court of Chancery originated are
described in KEBLY, HIsTORY OF EQurrY 37-46 (1890).
409 "Whether a case is decided under the pnnciples of the civil law or under those
of the common law, the result is almost invariably the same." Binfret (C.J., Canada),
The Civil Law and the Common Law, 23 N.Y.U.L. REv. 8, 13 (1948). Ishwar Saxena,
538 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
scribed as a force which gives shape to the ideal of decent and
honorable conduct in the relations of men. Divergence between legal
systems is less frequent in areas which require the application of
ethical standards comparable with those standards which are applied
in other institutions of social control. The divergences make their
presence manifest in areas where the lag between law and morals is
greatest. The cleft exists; but is it unbridgeable? For five hundred years
the western world was united under a single legal system known as
the zus gentium. Equity is the crystallization of the fundamental yearn-
ings of human nature toward a justice which shall be not only ordered
but compassionate. When the principles of equity are recognized in
all legal systems, we may hope for the establishment, through a corpus
aequitatis, of what Vico called a cvitas humants generis, a society of
human brotherhood. At any rate, we may catch "an echo of the
infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal
law "410
Rajasthan University, Jaipur, has expressed the opinon that even in the situations in
which the rules and theories of different legal systems seem at first sight to be entirely
different, it is often possible to find a common ground from the point of view of actual
results. See 17 REvuE INTERNAIoNALE DE Daorr CovmxARE 122 (1965) (remarks at
meeting of Parker School of Foreiga and Comparative Law, New York, Sept. 14-15,
1964).
41o Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. Bnv. 478 (1897).
